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ABSTRACT
This article responds to recent scholarship, and the
recent work of the European Commission of the European Union, advocating the use of ‘‘formula apportionment,’’ or ‘‘fractional apportionment,’’ as opposed
to the ‘‘arm’s-length’’ method in allocating the tax
base generated by transnational corporations (TNCs).
Historically, the United States and the international
community have used the arm’s-length method.1 This
use came under severe criticism in the mid- and late1980s. In response, in the mid-1990s the United
States and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) reformed their
approaches, the U.S. through changes in its regulations and the OECD through modification of its
guidelines for Member States, although they retained
the arm’s-length method. In the intervening time, experience has shown that the changes have not ameliorated, and may have exacerbated, the problems these
reforms were intended to address. This has led to
scholarship on the ‘‘great transfer pricing wars’’ —
the processes, from about 1985 to about 1995, by
which the revisions were developed — and both
scholarship and officialdom progress toward developing formula apportionment systems as an alternative
to arm’s-length. This recent scholarship underestimates the difficulty and misconstrues the nature of the
commitment of national governments and TNCs to
the arm’s-length system, and these misconstructions
may lead to recommendations for change not in keeping with the economic ideas that underlay the original
critique of the arm’s-length system.
This article reviews the scholarship detailing the
history of the ‘‘transfer pricing wars,’’ finding that
scholarship misleading and incomplete in a number of
respects. In particular, the article suggests that the tenacity and longevity of the arm’s-length system is a
product of ‘‘cognitive capture’’ — a term coined in a
presentation to the 2008 annual conference at Jackson
Hole, Wyoming, held by the Board of Governors of
the Federal Reserve System. ‘‘Cognitive capture’’ describes the tendency of regulatory and legislative officials to think exclusively in terms dictated by the
private interests they are supposed to regulate and
control — and the same tendency of academics with
1
§482 of the U.S. Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended
(the Code). All section (‘‘§’’) references are to the Code or the
regulations thereunder unless otherwise indicated.
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regard to interests they are supposed to objectively
evaluate. This kind of ‘‘cognitive capture’’ not only
has affected the bodies that adopted the transfer pricing changes in the mid-1990s and the academic supporters of those changes, but influences the current
advocates of fractional apportionment today to almost
as great an extent — preventing understanding of the
true dimensions of the longstanding controversy over
transfer pricing. The transfer pricing controversy is
described as part of an ongoing construction of the relationship between public institutions, on the one
hand, and businesses and other private institutions, on
the other, and changes wrought during the mid-1990s
represented a Clinton Administration abandonment of
‘‘Anglo-American’’ forms of capitalism, as opposed
to ‘‘rhenish’’ or continental brands. The transfer pricing controversy and the ongoing construction of
private-public relationships are related to issues growing out of the 2007–08 ‘‘financial crisis,’’ and the introduction of fractional apportionment should be coordinated with the development of international approaches to financial regulation.

ARTICLE
Within the last four years, two serious proposals
have been advanced for the actual adoption and
implementation of ‘‘formula apportionment’’ as a
means for dividing the corporate income tax base on
an international level. The first, developed over a
seven-year period between 2001 and 2008, and still in
the process of deliberation, results from the work of a
Task Force of the European Commission aimed at
proposing and defining a combined comprehensive
corporate tax base (CCCTB) for use by European
Union (EU) countries using formula apportionment.2
The second, set forth in a paper issued under the auspices of the Hamilton Project of the Brookings Institution,3 proposes that the U.S. unilaterally adopt a
‘‘profit split/formula apportionment’’ system, based
on sales as a single apportionment factor. The ideas of
the Hamilton Project subsequently received the endorsement of Michael C. Durst, a former Director of
the Internal Revenue Service’s Advance Pricing
Agreement (APA) Program,4 drawing much attention
throughout the international tax community because
2

See European Commission, ‘‘Implementing the Community
Programme for Improved Growth and Employment and the Enhanced Competitiveness of EU Business: Further Progress During
2006 and Next Steps Towards a Proposal on the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB),’’ 7 COM (2007) 223
(5/2/07), available at http://eur-lex.europa.euLexUriServ/site/en/
com/2007com2007_0223en01.pdf.
3
Clausing & Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in a
Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’’ (Brookings Institution 2007). The document is available at
2007 TNT 114–38.
4
Address of Michael C. Durst to the International Fiscal Association, The President’s International Tax Proposals in Historical
and Economic Perspective (5/21/09), available at 2009 TNT 108–
19, and 123 Tax Notes 1269 (6/8/09) [hereinafter Durst

the APA Program, first adopted in 1991, was a major
achievement to preserve the existing ‘‘arm’s-length’’
system of allocating tax profits among nations for tax
purposes.
In the last 50 years, there have been two cycles of
development of standards in this area, both under the
rubric of ‘‘arm’s-length.’’ The first occurred during the
1960s, when the U.S. first articulated rules for implementing the standard. The second occurred from 1985
to 1995, at the close of which the standards inherited
from the 1960s were revised — by U.S. regulations
finalized in 1994 5 and Guidelines issued by the OrPresentation]. Durst was chief of the APA division in the mid1990s.
5
The regulations were adopted in final form in T.D. 8552, 59
Fed. Reg. 34971 (7/8/94), substantially as had been promulgated
as temporary regulations Jan. 21, 1993 (the second day of the
Clinton Administration), T.D. 8470, 58 Fed. Reg. 5263. The temporary regulations were issued without notice and comment, and
were simultaneously issued as proposed regulations (finalized in
July 1994). The 1993 temporary regulations removed proposed
regulations that had been issued Jan. 30, 1992. INTL-0372-88;
INTL-0401-88, 57 Fed. Reg. 3571. The temporary and final regulations were made effective for taxable years beginning after Oct.
6, 1994, although taxpayers were given certain options to apply
them retroactively.
The final regulations appear today, in amended form, as Regs.
§1.482-1 (general rules); §1.482-2 (specific situations: loans, services, and use of tangible property, in the original regulations as
issued in 1994, loans and use of tangible property now); §1.482-3
(transfer of tangible property); §1.482-4 (transfer and use of intangible property), §1.482-5 (comparable profit method); §1.482-6
(profit split method); §1.482-7T (cost sharing); and §1.482-8 (examples of ‘‘best method’’ rule). The significant changes made,
particularly with respect to Regs. §§1.482-2 and 1.482-7T, and the
addition of §1.482-9, are discussed presently.
This article within does not survey the details of the regulations or the OECD Guidelines; this, like the literature it surveys
and to which it in part responds, concerns general policy, not rule
details, and, like that literature, assumes some basic background
in the general content of the rules. For a discussion of the details
of the existing rules, see Langbein, ‘‘Transfer Pricing and the Outsourcing Problem,’’ 106 Tax Notes 1299 (3/14/05). However, a
brief statement of what the existing regulations are, and whence
they came, will be helpful.
The original regulations were in Regs. §§1.482-1 and 1.482-2.
Section 1.482-1, like its successor, set forth general rules. Section
1.482-1 had five subsections, lettered (a) through (e), which dealt
with five specific intercompany situations: (a) lending; (b) provision of services; (c) leasing of tangible property; (d) licensing or
transfer of intangible property; and (e) transfer of tangible property. The fighting issues were always in Regs. §1.482-2(d) and (e),
which set forth the methods for determining intercompany transfer prices (the ‘‘comparable uncontrolled price’’ (CUP) method;
the ‘‘resale price’’ method, and the ‘‘cost-plus’’ method under
those rules).
The 1994 revisions greatly expanded and complicated the general rules provisions, adding three new major concepts. The first
was the ‘‘best method’’ rule. Under the 1968, there had been a defined priority of methods: CUP, resale price, cost-plus, and unspecified ‘‘fourth methods’’ when necessary. The ‘‘best method’’
rule abolished any fixed priority, in effect directing the use of the
method for which the best data were available. The second was
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ganisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) in 1995 (hereinafter 1995 OECD
Guidelines). The latter cycle involved quite bitter controversies, culminating in an explicit condemnation of
formula apportionment by the OECD Guidelines.6
Fifteen years has now elapsed since the issuance of
the OECD Guidelines, sufficient time for them and the
counterpart revised regulations to be evaluated. The
current exploration of formula apportionment reflects
widespread and pronounced dissatisfaction with the
Guidelines. In 2003, Mr. Durst co-authored a major
article examining the experience with the Guidelines.7
The article accomplished three major tasks. First, it
detailed a history of what Durst has called the ‘‘great
transfer pricing wars’’ of the 1985–95 period. Second,
it explored certain conceptual discontinuities and
anomalies in the regulations-Guidelines system
the ‘‘arm’s-length’’ range and the third, complex rules for defining
comparability.
As for the specific situations, the first three — lending, services, leasing — were not changed by the 1994 regulations, but
essentially retained as Regs. §1.482(a)–(c), respectively. The
‘‘tangible property’’ rules, with the three methods set forth in the
1968 regulations, were moved from Regs. §1.482-2(e) to newly
numbered Regs. §1.482-3, with significant modifications. The
‘‘intangible property’’ rules were moved from Regs. §1.482-2(d)
to newly numbered Regs. §1.482-4, with still more significant
modifications. Two new pricing methods were added: the comparable uncontrolled price method (Regs. §1.482-5); and the profit
split method (Regs. §1.482-6). The OECD Guidelines call them
‘‘profit methods,’’ as opposed to the three methods derived from
the 1968 regulations, which the Guidelines call ‘‘transactional
methods.’’ The genesis of these new methods is discussed within.
In addition, the new regulations added Regs. §1.482-7, governing
‘‘cost sharing’’ devices; and Regs. §1.482-8, giving examples of
the ‘‘best method’’ rules.
The Bush Administration made significant revisions to the
regulations, as noted within. In particular, the ‘‘services’’ rules,
which were not revised in 1994, were subject to extensive revisions and moved from Regs. §1.482-2(b) to new Regs. §1.482-9,
in regulations finalized in 2009. T.D. 9476, 74 Fed. Reg. 38830
(8/4/09). These regulations were promulgated as temporary regulations by T.D. 9278, 71 Fed. Reg. 44466 (8/4/06). At the same
time these changes in the ‘‘services’’ regulations were made, the
Administration made significant changes to Regs. §§1.482-1, -4,
and -6.
In addition, in 2005, the Treasury issued a notice of proposed
rulemaking to amend the cost-sharing rules on Aug. 29, 2005. 70
Fed. Reg. 51116. These rules, substantially amended, were promulgated as temporary regulations on Jan. 5, 2009, as T.D. 9441,
74 Fed. Reg. 340. The temporary regulations are set forth at Regs.
§1.482-7T, and expire on Dec. 31, 2011. Regs. §1.482-7T(n).
They are effective after Jan. 4, 2009. The prior regulations, effective until Jan. 4, 2009, appear at Regs. §1.482-7A.
The provisions of the 1968 regulations remain applicable to
taxable years beginning on or before Apr. 21, 1993, and those that
are not incorporated in the currently effective regulations appear
at Regs. §§1.482-1A and 1.482-2A.
6
1995 OECD Guidelines at ¶¶3.58–3.74, pp. III-19 to III-24.
7
Durst and Culbertson, ‘‘Clearing Away the Sand: Retrospective Methods and Prospective Documentation in Transfer Pricing
Today,’’ 57 Tax L. Rev. 37 (2003) [hereinafter Durst &
Culbertson].

adopted in the mid-1990s. Third, it elaborated on certain practical difficulties with experience under the revised rules, with suggestions for certain ‘‘incremental’’ reforms.
The suggested reforms, however, stopped short of
calling for an outright rejection of the arm’s-length
system, reflecting, in part, continuing, widespread
hostility to the idea of fractional apportionment.8 This
hesitation makes all the more striking Mr. Durst’s re8

Even at that, Durst and Culbertson hedged. The article was
published in 2003, two years after the European Commission had
instituted the study of a CCCTB with formula apportionment.
Durst and Culbertson quoted congressional testimony of the thenAssistant Secretary of the Treasury for Tax Policy, a statement by
an OECD official about ‘‘softening’’ positions on the matter, and
articles on the European Commission’s emerging interest in formula apportionment. Referring to these, they issued this anticipatory hedge:
In the relatively short time during which this Article was
initially drafted, discussed in draft form in a seminar
setting, and prepared for publication, it appears that political alignments have shifted in a way that may increase the likelihood of changes to transfer pricing rules
that are more fundamental than those suggested in this
Article. See notes 314–16 and accompanying text. Even
if that is the case, however (and political predictions, it
must be remembered, are hazardous), we hope that the
analysis provided in this Article will assist in the design
of whatever fundamental reforms are considered desirable.
Durst & Culbertson at 41 n.6.
One theme throughout this piece concerns the extraordinary timidity of practitioners to question arm’s-length publicly, and the
discrepancy between views they express in protected, confidential
settings, and those they are willing to make in public. In this
sense, Durst’s recent statements do show considerable courage,
however late in his day they may come. For instance, at a 1996
University of Miami conference, a highly regarded international
tax practitioner who had been an international tax official at the
time of the 1962 consideration of the adoption of amendments to
§482, made the extraordinary statement that he and another official had assured Congress that the Treasury could accomplish administratively what the proposed statutory change would have
achieved (namely, the adoption of a formulary system), and that
in so doing, they ‘‘lied’’ — that was his word. In this context, the
frequent recent discussion of arm’s-length and formula apportionment constituting a ‘‘continuum,’’ and of the possibility of a
‘‘mixed’’ system employing both formula apportionment and
arm’s-length (see, e.g., Sullivan, ‘‘Economic Analysis: A Middle
Path Between the Arm’s Length and Formulary Methods,’’ 2010
TNT 11-6 (1/14/10), should be approached with awareness of the
true origin of that idea at the 2003 Chartres conference (discussed
below) and the manner in which national governments and international organizations treated the idea after it was first expressed
with some apparent official acquiescence, in the mid-1990s. Durst
and Culbertson themselves observe that ‘‘even nonspecialized personnel of the taxpayer’’ have come to view practice under the new
regulations as ‘‘little more than wheel spinning,’’ and quote one
observer that ‘‘[t]he new specialty of ‘comparables experts’ is a
concrete example of economic waste.’’ Durst & Culbertson at 113
& n.272, quoting Hamaekers, ‘‘Arm’s Length — How Long?’’ in
International and Comparative Taxation, Essays in Honour of
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cent expression of support for fractional apportionment — in Toronto at a meeting of the International
Fiscal Association (IFA), a forum that could be expected to be quite hostile to the idea.
Durst followed the IFA presentation by coauthoring a paper detailing a statutory proposal for a
formula apportion/profit split method to be proposed
for adoption by Congress as a unilateral U.S. measure.9 That paper linked the proposal in a number of
respects to the history of the ‘‘transfer pricing wars’’
detailed the Durst-Culbertson.
In 1986, I published what has become a ‘‘well
known’’ 10 article questioning the claims that ‘‘arm’slength’’ was an established international norm, and arguing that the standard was inherently unusable for
the purpose of making international income allocations.11 In 1991, I presented a paper arguing for a
‘‘modified fractional apportionment’’ system for international adoption to an annual tax policy conference
at the University of Michigan.12 Naturally, I was disappointed by the U.S.’s abandonment of any effort for
serious reform in the early 1990s, and by the promulgation of a system representing only a minor change
in 1994–96, and I now welcome the renewed interest
in formula apportionment proposals.
Nevertheless, I believe there are flaws in both of
the major proposals publicized in the last four years.
Perhaps more important, I believe there are serious
omissions and errors in the account of the ‘‘transfer
pricing wars’’ set forth in Durst-Culbertson, and that
these omissions not only bear important links to the
flaws in the proposals set forth in the proposals of
Avi-Yonah, Clausing, and Durst, but also bear the poKlaus Vogel 29, 44.
If professionals recognize their practice as ‘‘waste,’’ why are
there so few specialists who will call for fundamental reform of
the rules, and why does it take them so long to do so? And if there
is a longstanding and serious discrepancy between what these
practitioners say publicly and what they admit privately, how
much credibility do any of their public statements have?
9
Avi-Yonah, Clausing and Durst, ‘‘Allocating Business Profits
for Tax Purposes: A Proposal to Adopt a Formulary Profit Split,’’
9 Fla. Tax Rev. 497 (2009) [hereinafter A-YCD]. The authors describe their proposal as ‘‘similar in significant respects to the current ‘residual profit split’ method of the U.S. transfer pricing regulations and the OECD Guidelines,’’ 9 Fla. Tax Rev. at 498, and its
title (a ‘‘formula profit split’’), which contrasts with that of the
Hamilton Project paper (‘‘formula apportionment’’), appears expressly aimed at emphasizing the point. But the origin of idea of
‘‘continuity’’ between arm’s-length and formula apportionment is
poorly understood, as I show below, in ways which I think overestimate the extent to which that logical continuity bears potential
for influencing the course of political events. See note 92 above
and accompanying text.
10
As described in Thomas, ‘‘Customary International Law and
State Taxation of Corporate Income: The Case for the Separate
Accounting Method,’’ 14 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 99, 125 (1996).
11
Langbein, ‘‘The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s
Length,’’ 30 Tax Notes 625 (2/17/86) [hereinafter Langbein, Unitary Method].
12
Langbein, ‘‘A Modified Fractional Apportionment Proposal
for Tax Transfer Pricing,’’ Tax Notes 719 (2/10/92).

tential of distorting and undermining future consideration given to the entire question. Most important of
all, I believe that the transfer pricing question is
linked — in ways that have never been adequately explored — to larger questions of international economic policy, both historically and currently, involving the definition of the very relationships among national governments, international organizations, and
private interest groups, including multinational firms
and organizations representing them collectively.
In the wake of recent international financial and
economic turmoil, I believe it of moment to explore
the relationship of the longstanding, continuing, ongoing transfer pricing controversy to these larger policy
concerns. This article is an effort to examine some of
these considerations.

I. THE RISE OF FRACTIONAL
APPORTIONMENT
The period immediately following World War II
saw the emergence of the modern transnational corporation (TNC), and the two decades since the end of
the Cold War have witnessed further development of
TNCs, which has accompanied explosive growth in
the volume of international trade. TNCs pose daunting challenges to the effort to impose and collect corporate income taxes by the nations in which the TNCs
operate. The core of the challenge is the determination
of which states have the right to tax the combined corporate income of a given TNC, and of what amounts
should be allocated. Historically, this determination
has been made by the construction of (ordinarily hypothetical) prices imputed to (also ordinarily hypothetical) ‘‘transactions’’ among the various components of the TNC. The prices so constructed are called
‘‘transfer prices,’’ and the subject of their determination is referred to as ‘‘transfer pricing.’’
Under U.S. law, transfer pricing is accomplished
pursuant to authority conferred by §482 of the Code,
a sparsely worded provision that confers authority on
the Treasury to allocate items of income, deduction,
gain, loss, or credit among related organizations in order to prevent evasion of taxes or to clearly reflect income. This brief provision is implemented by extensive and complex regulations.13 The development of
these regulations has come through two distinct historical events. The first was in the 1960s, after the
Kennedy Administration and Congress first exhibited
serious concern about the problem of taxing TNCs.
This episode culminated in the issuance of the first set
of comprehensive transfer pricing regulations in
1968.14 The second was between the mid-1980s and
mid-1990s, when congressional and administrative,
and to some extent public, concern about the growth
of international business, and about difficulties with
the 1968 regulations, led to a major overhaul of the
13
Regs. §§1.482-1 to 1.482-9; 1.482-1A; 1.482-2A; 1.482-7A;
1.482-4T, 1.482-6T; 1.482-7T.
14
The history of this period is detailed extensively in Langbein,
Unitary Method, at 642–47, and Durst & Culbertson at 48–58.
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regulations in 1994. This is the period of the ‘‘great
transfer pricing wars’’ to which Durst refers.
The OECD responded, in both interludes, to U.S.
initiatives with the issuance of guidelines for tax administrations and multinational enterprises of OECD
Member States. These guidelines have largely either
followed, or been coordinated with, the conceptual
approach of the U.S. regulations. The guidelines following the first (1968) regulations were issued in the
form of a report in 1979.15 Those corresponding to the
1994 regulations were apparently developed in conjunction with the U.S.’s development of the 1994
regulations.16
Throughout these developments, the U.S. and the
OECD have professed fidelity to the principle that
transfer pricing should be accomplished pursuant to
the ‘‘arm’s-length’’ standard. This standard holds that
profit should be allocated by determining a ‘‘transfer
price’’ between components of an integrated group
that reflects the price that would be charged were
those components separate enterprises dealing with
each other at arm’s length. This standard is often said
to be the international norm for determining transfer
prices.17
The process by which the 1995 U.S. regulations
and the 1995–96 OECD Guidelines emerged constitute Durst’s ‘‘great transfer pricing wars,’’ 18 instigated, apparently, by public challenges to the notion
that transfer pricing should be accomplished according to the arm’s-length standard.19 The challenge was
twofold, questioning first whether arm’s-length was
actually the ‘‘norm’’ and what kind of norm it was,
and second whether — as a theoretical and a practical
matter — arm’s-length was an appropriate or workable rubric for the task assigned to it, whatever were
established norms. The second point was the more important, and the more widely asserted. The U.S. government never publicly questioned whether arm’slength was the norm, but a 1988 ‘‘White Paper’’ paid
considerable attention to outstanding commentary
questioning the theoretical basis of the standard.20
The historically accepted alternative to arm’slength is so-called formula apportionment (sometimes
‘‘fractional apportionment’’), which proceeds by di15

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
(OECD), Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrations (1979).
16
OECD Guidelines.
17
See Regs. §1.482-1(b)(1); OECD Guidelines at ¶¶1.1–1.14,
pp. I-6 to I-7. See generally Thomas, ‘‘Customary International
Law and State Taxation of Corporate Income: The Case for the
Separate Accounting Method,’’ 14 Berkeley J. Int’l L. 99, 125
(1996).
18
Durst Presentation (‘‘I need to stop our time machine briefly
for a visit to the late 1980s and early 1990s, that tumultuous period which has come to be called the time of the ‘great transfer
pricing wars.’ ’’).
19
Langbein, Unitary Method; see Durst & Culbertson, at n.107.
20
Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458, 483 & nn. 194–95, citing
Langbein, Unitary Method, at 625 (discussing ‘‘continuum price
problem,’’ as described below).

viding the combined profit of a group according to
criteria reflecting the relationship of the group or its
members to the various states in question (tangible assets, payroll, sales in the various states, or other similar criteria). The use of this method by the American
states in the decade preceding the ‘‘transfer pricing
wars’’ provoked a prolonged controversy resulting in
the virtually forced abandonment of the method.21
During that time, formula apportionment also was
viewed almost as a kind of offense, a recreant state
practice.22 During the ‘‘wars,’’ possibly as a result of
the harsh criticism to which arm’s-length was subjected, this began to change. Nevertheless, the OECD
reports explicitly, if not stridently, rejected formula
apportionment as a ‘‘non-arm’s-length’’ method.23
A decade and a half have passed since the United
States and its trading partners began to work under the
new regulations, which a few years ago were subject
to revisions that may have been more significant than
commentators acknowledge.24 The experience does
not seem to confirm the conviction of arm’s-length
adherents that the standard could be made workable
without discarding the standard’s essential principle.
Numerous commentators have expressed doubts about
the workability or effectiveness of the regulations,25
and there has been a veritable explosion of interest in,
and exploration of the workability of, formula apportionment.26 Some of the interest in formula apportionment has been expressed by commentators who were
21

See Langbein, Unitary Method at 626, 673 & n.1.
Durst & Culbertson, at 78.
23
OECD Guidelines at ¶¶3.58–3.74, pp. III-19 to III-24. Cf.
also the remarks of then Deputy Treasury Secretary Lawrence
Summers, quoted and discussed below.
24
See Langbein, ‘‘Transfer Pricing and the Outsourcing Problem,’’ 106 Tax Notes 1299 (3/14/05). On the particular changes,
see note 4 above; their significance is discussed briefly at notes
116–20, 123–27 below.
25
See Durst & Culbertson 40–41, 125–127; Brauner, ‘‘Value in
the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation of Intangibles for Transfer Pricing Purposes,’’ 28 Va. Tax Rev. 79 (2008); Benshalom,
‘‘Sourcing the ‘Unsourceable’: The Cost Sharing Regulations and
the Sourcing of Affiliated Intangible-Related Transactions,’’ 26 Va.
Tax Rev. 79 (2007); A-YDC.
26
Durst Presentation; A-YCD; McLure, Jr., ‘‘Harmonizing
Corporate Income Taxes in the European Community: Rationale
and Implications,’’ in Tax Policy and the Economy; Weiner,
‘‘Practical Aspects of Implementing Formula Apportionment in
the European Union,’’ 8 Fla. Tax Rev. 629 (2007); Roin, ‘‘Can the
Income Tax Be Saved? The Promise and Pitfalls of Adopting
Worldwide Formulary Apportionment,’’ 61 Tax L. Rev. 169 (2008)
(criticizing recent proposals to adopt formula apportionment). For
a report on a January 2010 conference in which the question of a
shift to formula apportionment was much on the minds of the participants, see Sullivan, ‘‘Economic Analysis: A Middle Path Between the Arm’s Length and Formulary Methods,’’ 2010 TNT 11-6
(1/14/10). To these sources must be added the veritable treasure
of the occasional contributions of Tax Notes contributing editors
Lee Sheppard (who writes ‘‘news analysis’’) and Martin Sullivan
(who writes ‘‘economic analysis’’), ordinarily both quite critical
of the arm’s-length standard, and, particularly in Sheppard’s inimitable and patented way, caustic but breathtakingly accurate in
22
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active during the ‘‘wars’’ of the 1986–94 period — on
the side of the adherents of arm’s-length.27 In May
2009, the Obama Administration issued a series of
significant proposals to reform international tax
rules.28 These proposals did not include changes to
the transfer pricing rules, but they stimulated discussion in which the central role of those rules, as well
as abiding difficulties with the 1995 revisions, were
highlighted. Most striking was Michael Durst’s May
22, 2009, address to the IFA.
Professor Reuven Avi-Yonah, a consistent and articulate critic of arm’s-length, recently commented
that the difficulties with arm’s-length are well-known
and do not bear repeating.29 This perhaps true in the
context in which Professor Avi-Yonah is writing. But
the 1995 regulations were a significant effort to resuscitate an ailing system; the experience under those
regulations contributes to an understanding of what
alternatives exist now and how they might be implemented, and continuing commentary has generated
certain ideas in relation to the transfer pricing problem as it has developed under the regulations and
guidelines that emerged in the mid-1990s. It is useful
to revisit the original indictment made of the arm’slength standard, and to update and refine the ideas underlying that indictment in light of these various developments.

II. THREE PRELUDES TO THE
‘‘TRANSFER PRICING WARS’’
In approaching these questions, it is necessary to
review the events of the ‘‘great transfer pricing wars,’’
which led to the current regulations/guidelines. But
first it is important to emphasize three developments,
or sets of developments, that immediately preceded
taking aim at its many irrationalities. E.g., Sheppard, ‘‘News
Analysis: Stress Testing Transfer Pricing,’’ 122 Tax Notes 1187
(3/9/09); Sheppard, ‘‘News Analysis: IFA Considers Transfer Pricing and Treaty Questions,’’ 117 Tax Notes 305 (10/22/07); Sheppard, ‘‘News Analysis: Practical Advice for the Section 482 Services Regs,’’ 2006 TNT 239-6 (12/12/06); Sheppard, ‘‘News
Analysis: Revenge of the Source Countries, Part 6: Subsidiary as
PE,’’ 113 Tax Notes 210 (10/16/06); Sullivan, ‘‘Economic Analysis: Transfer Pricing Costs U.S. at Least $28 Billion,’’ 2010 TNT
54-3 (3/17/10); Sullivan, ‘‘Economic Analysis: Half the Profits for
None of the Work,’’ 2005 TNT 176-8 (9/12/05). Cf. Sheppard,
‘‘News Analysis: Banks’ Foreign Tax Credit Arbitrage,’’ 2006
TNT 137-4 (7/11/06).
27
Durst Presentation; McLure, Jr., ‘‘Harmonizing Corporate Income Taxes in the European Community: Rationale and Implications,’’ in Tax Policy and the Economy.
28
The release, ‘‘Leveling the Playing Field: Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives For Shifting Jobs Overseas,’’
appears at 2009 TNT 84-44 (5/4/09). The 2010 budget made some
revisions to these proposals, some reflecting concerns that pertain
to transfer pricing; but the Administration (in its own patented
way) has also signaled considerable ambivalence about whether it
is serious about any of the proposals. See discussion of proposals
by the U.S. government later in this article.
29
Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Xilinx and the Arm’s Length Standard,’’ Tax
Notes 1231 (6/8/09).

the onset of the review of the arm’s-length system.
These developments played a significant role in what
followed, but that role is routinely underestimated and
possibly poorly understood by those commentators
who have described the ensuing ‘‘wars.’’

A. The Attack on the States’ Use of
Fractional Apportionment
The first, as noted above, was the campaign —
principally by foreign governments and enterprises
but joined by U.S. enterprises — against the states’
use of formulary systems. That campaign passed
through four stages. First, the enterprises sought to
ban formula apportionment through income tax conventions. A renegotiated convention with the United
Kingdom signed in 1976 included a provision that
would have prohibited the use of the system. This effort failed when the Senate refused to ratify that convention.30 Second, the enterprises sought federal legislation that would have prohibited use of formula apportionment, but neither house of Congress showed
even enough interest in such legislation ever to report
any bill from any committee.31 Third, the enterprises
sought a judicial ruling that the use of the methods
was an unconstitutional interference with the power of
the federal government to speak with ‘‘one voice’’ in
international affairs. The Supreme Court rejected this
position in Container Corp. v. Franchise Tax Board.32
Finally, the Reagan Administration convened a Working Group to forge a compromise between the state
governments and business on the issue. The Working
Group developed a compromise, implemented by
1986, under which the state governments would limit
formula apportionment at the ‘‘water’s edge’’; that is,
they would apply it domestically but would not impose it on the worldwide operations of multinational
enterprises.33
This controversy, like its successor, spanned about
a decade; also like its successor, it generated extraordinary heat. One question is why the sides were as intense as they were. After all, what was involved was
only state corporate income or franchise taxes the
rates of which are not high when compared to those
imposed at the federal level or by the national government of most of the U.S.’s major trading partners. But
those involved understood that, especially for foreign
multinationals, what was really at stake was what we
now call ‘‘transparency’’: Formula apportionment, applied on a worldwide basis, required the collection
and reporting of worldwide information about a consolidated enterprise to subnational authorities in the
United States. And one such authority, the Franchise
Tax Board of the State of California, was particularly
nettlesome in this regard. Such reporting was costly,
30
See 124 Cong. Rec. 18400, 19076 (1979). See Langbein,
Unitary Method at 626, 673 & n.1.
31
See Langbein, Unitary Method at 626, 673 & n.1.
32
463 U.S. 159 (1983).
33
See Langbein, Unitary Method at 626, 673 & n.1.
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inconvenient, difficult, sometimes impossible; moreover, it might threaten the ability of enterprises to protect trade and other secrets that, as theory would ultimately demonstrate, are ordinarily at the core of the
operation of multinationals.

B. Capital Export Neutrality and
‘‘Classification and Assignment’’
The second pre-‘‘war’’ development was a revision
in general ideas about the international tax policy of
the United States. Before the early 1980s, and especially beginning in the 1960s, the touchstone of that
policy was thought to be ‘‘capital export neutrality’’
(CEN) — the notion that international tax policy
should be structured to minimize its effect on incentives of persons subject to the jurisdiction of the taxing body on whether to invest domestically or
abroad.34 This was distinguished from other ideas
such as ‘‘capital import neutrality’’ (miminizing the
effect of taxation on whether capital was placed
within the taxing jurisdiction or abroad) or ‘‘national
neutrality’’ (minimizing the effect on incentives of the
nation whose taxes were imposed on cross-border investments).35 It was assumed that CEN had dominated international policy since such policy had begun
to be seriously formulated in the period following
World War I; an initial and influential academic survey early in that period to a considerable extent bore
this assumption out.36 And CEN was a dominant idea
behind proposals first made by the Kennedy Administration to ‘‘end deferral,’’ that is, to tax currently the
income of the foreign subsidiaries of U.S. multinationals — proposals that sired the subpart F provisions and the first amplification of the ‘‘arm’s-length’’
idea in the mid-1960s.
34

See Bradford, U.S. Treasury Tax Policy Staff, Blueprints for
Basic Tax Reform 89–90 (2d ed. 1984); U.S. Treasury Dep’t, ‘‘Selected Tax Policy Implications of Global Electronic Commerce,’’
reprinted in BNA Daily Tax Rpt. (11/22/96) at L-8; Joint Comm.
on Tax’n, 106th Cong., Overview of Present-Law Rules and Economic Issues in International Taxation (Comm. Print 1999); Joint
Comm. on Tax’n, 102d Cong., Factors Affecting the International
Competitiveness of the United States 5 (Comm. Print 1991); ‘‘The
President’s Tax Proposals to the Congress for Fairness, Growth,
and Simplicity’’ 383 (1985); Treasury Dep’t, ‘‘Selected Tax Policy
Implications of Global Electronic Commerce’’ 19 (1996); Inland
Revenue, ‘‘Double Taxation Relief For Companies: A Discussion
Paper’’ (1999) (UK Ministry of Finance), available at http://
www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/consult/dtrc.htm; Treasury Dep’t.,
‘‘The Deferral of Income Earned Through U.S. Controlled Foreign Corporations: A Policy Study’’ 23–54 (2000). See generally
Graetz & O’Hear, ‘‘The ‘Original Intent’ of U.S. International
Taxation,’’ 46 Duke L. J. 1021, 1033–35 (1997).
35
See generally Graetz, ‘‘Taxing International Income: Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies,’’ 54 Tax L. Rev. 261, 272–76 (2001).
36
Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the Financial Committee by Professors Bivens, Einaudi, Selligman, and Sir Josiah
Stamp, League of Nations Doc. E.F.S. 73 F. 19 (1923). This assumption is attacked in Graetz & O’Hear, ‘‘The ‘Original Intent’
of U.S. International Taxation,’’ 46 Duke L. J. 1021, 1033–35
(1997).

But beginning in 1980, especially with testimony
given by then International Tax Counsel H. David
Rosenbloom to the Oversight Subcommittee of the
House Ways and Means Committee,37 a review of international and U.S. treaty policy revealed that the dynamic actual policy, both of the U.S. and the international trading community, was not CEN, with its emphasis on the primary right of a ‘‘residence’’ state to
tax, but a more complex ‘‘classification and assignment’’ system, which assigned a primary right to tax
to the residence state with respect to portfolio income,
but a primary right to the ‘‘source’’ state to tax certain
more ‘‘local,’’ less ‘‘motile,’’ forms of income, from
realty and active business. In ensuing years, this discovery would rather quickly become a ‘‘conventional
wisdom,’’ so much so that influential scholarly publications would mention it with little discussion.38 But
this change in the view of overall policy would
greatly influence the course of transfer pricing policy.

C. The Marc Rich Prosecution
A third consequential development was a prosecution brought by the Justice Department in a highly
visible transfer pricing case. In September 1983, the
U.S. Attorney for the Southern District of New York
37
Income Tax Treaties: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Oversight of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 96th Cong.,
2d Sess. 57–88, 107–130 (4/29/80). The testimony is reprinted as
Rosenbloom & Langbein, ‘‘United States Tax Treaty Policy: An
Overview,’’ 19 Colum. J. of Transnat’l Law 359 (1981).
38
See Avi-Yonah, ‘‘The Structure of International Taxation: A
Proposal for Simplification,’’ 74 Tex. L. Rev. 1301, 1306 (1996)
(‘‘the ultimate goal underlying the international tax regime is that
active business income should be taxed in the country in which it
originates (the source country) and passive income should be
taxed in the country in which the recipient of the income resides
(the residence country)’’); Warren, Jr., ‘‘Alternatives for International Corporate Tax Reform,’’ 49 Tax L. Rev. 599, 599–600
(‘‘The conventional division of the international income tax base
. . . is that the source country has primary jurisdiction over corporate taxation, while the residence country has primary jurisdiction
over investor taxation’’) (emphasis added); Ault, ‘‘Corporate Integration, Tax Treaties, and the Division of the International Tax
Base: Principles and Practices,’’ 47 Tax L. Rev. 565 (1992)
(‘‘[T]he League Report finally recommended the ‘method of classification and assignment of sources’ as the basis for bilateral tax
treaties [under which ] items of income were classified and then
assigned to either the residence jurisdiction or the source jurisdiction. . . . [T]he right to tax business income, including the income
of affiliated companies, was assigned to the source state. The right
to tax income from business securities, however, was assigned exclusively to the residence state.’’). Both the Ault and Warren articles rely upon the Rosenbloom & Langbein article, primarily,
and the Avi-Yonah article relies upon the Ault and Warren articles.
Both Ault and Warren rely upon Ke, ‘‘International Double Taxation of Income: Relief Through International Agreement 19211945,’’ 59 Harv. L. Rev. 73, 85 (1945), as well, although that article received little attention during the period between its writing
and after the Rosenbloom testimony in 1980. Moreover, the Ke
article, though it details the emergence of a ‘‘classification and assignment’’ system in the 1920s, is clearly, in its conclusion, on the
side of the Seligman/CEN primacy view of optimum policy.
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indicted Marc Rich and Pincus Green, two prominent
commodities traders, and two corporations controlled
by them — Marc Rich + Co. AG, a Swiss corporation
that did no business in the United States, and Marc
Rich + Co. International, Inc., its wholly owned subsidiary, which was incorporated in Switzerland, but
was engaged in a trading business in New York — on
charges of tax evasion stemming from transactions
during 1979 and 1980 in controlled oil, which on the
surface appeared to have taken place entirely in Texas.
The investigation leading to the indictments had already generated extensive and significant litigation
concerning the government’s power to compel the
production of documents held offshore by the Swiss
company.39 Green and Rich were U.S. citizens who
had been resident in New York but maintained offices
in Zug, Switzerland. In April 1983, Rich and Green
departed New York for Zug, and did not return to answer the indictment. The two corporations pleaded
guilty to the charges in October 1984, and paid some
$150 to $200 million in taxes, interest, and penalties.40
Rich and Green became wanted ‘‘fugitives,’’ and
have remained abroad since. But a few years after the
guilty plea, their counsel, who were different from the
counsel who had represented them and the companies
in connection with the original investigation and the
guilty plea, presented to the prosecutors proposed
findings of fact and conclusions of law authored by
Professors Martin Ginsburg of Georgetown and Bernard Wolfman of Harvard, both highly respected tax
scholars, which indicated that the transactions at issue
did not generate taxable income to the corporations.41
This was because the apparently Texas-based transactions were linked to offshore oil transactions; and the
income from those transactions, though on the surface
U.S.-source, was, when properly understood, foreignsource income, protected from U.S. taxation by the
provisions of the (archaic) income tax convention
with Switzerland in effect then (and still).
The prosecutors declined to respond to the entreaties of the new counsel and to credit the proffers of
Professors Ginsburg and Wolfman, absent the return
of the principals to face the charges. The impasse
stood for over a decade, until, in the waning hours of
his Administration, President Clinton entered a surprise pardon of Rich and Green, relying heavily upon
the views of Professors Ginsburg and Wolfman. The
39

See In re Marc Rich + Co. A.G., 707 F.2d 663 (2d Cir. 1982),
cert. denied, 463 U.S. 1215 (1983).
40
See Lubasch, ‘‘Marc Rich’s Companies Plead Guilty,’’ New
York Times (10/12/84) p. D1; ‘‘Biggest U.S. Tax Evasion Costs
200 Million Dollars / Fugitive Swiss Oil Trader Marc Rich and
U.S. Lawyer Pincus Green Still Sought,’’ The Guardian (London)
(10/12/84).
41
The conclusions of Professors Wolfman and Ginsburg were
set forth in a set of detailed proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law proffered to the prosecution in 1990. The proposed Findings and Conclusions are set forth at 2001 TNT 36-34.
They were made public subsequent to the controversial pardon of
Rich and Green by President Clinton in January 2001.

pardon generated enormous public controversy, and
both a congressional and a criminal investigation of
the pardon and the former President. Ultimately, no
charges were brought against the President or any
other parties in connection with the pardon. But the
entire episode served, at the beginning of the heated
debate over transfer pricing, as a sample of the poison
broth that could be brewed from the toxic ingredients
of zealous government and arcane and highly indefinite transfer pricing laws.
A fourth set of developments can be treated as a
prelude to ‘‘war’’: congressional enactments in the
1982–86 period. I recount these, rather, as an integral
part of the 1985–95 developments, which I think follows the predominant practice of current literature.42

III. THE ONSET OF THE WARS
Current literature characteristically acknowledges43
that the pre-1986 history of the transfer pricing rules
is well documented in two studies, one by myself in
1986,44 the other by Professor Avi-Yonah in 199545
(updated in 2006).46 The article by Durst and Culbertson in 2003 included a review of the pre-1986 background, as well as a section on ‘‘recent history,’’
which recounted the 1985–95 history as well.47

A. Congressional Action, 1982–86
The changes wrought during the ‘‘great transfer
pricing wars,’’ begin, as Durst and Culbertson recount, with congressional action in the early 1980s.
The first such action was the enactment of §936(h) in
the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of
1982.48 Section 936(h) articulated ‘‘profit split’’ and
‘‘cost sharing’’ methods for imputing intangible income away from Puerto Rican subsidiaries (and those
of other U.S. possessions) to U.S. parents. Durst and
Culbertson call these ‘‘a form of formulary apportionment,’’ and, while this characterization might be controversial, the concepts are a core part of the compromises ultimately reached in the overall transfer pricing debate.49 In 1984, in the Deficit Reduction Act,
Congress adopted the ‘‘superroyalty’’ rule for ‘‘out42

E.g., Durst & Culbertson, at 61–64.
E.g., Durst and Culbertson, ‘‘Clearing Away the Sand: Retrospective Methods and Prospective Documentation in Transfer
Pricing Today,’’ 57 Tax L. Rev. 37, 43 & n.8 (2003).
44
Langbein, ‘‘The Unitary Method and the Myth of Arm’s
Length,’’ 30 Tax Notes 625 (2/17/86).
45
Avi-Yonah, ‘‘The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in
the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation,’’ 15 Va. Tax Rev. 89
(1995).
46
Avi-Yonah, ‘‘The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in
the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation,’’ 9 Fin. and Tax Law
Rev. 310 (2006).
47
Durst and Culbertson, ‘‘Clearing Away the Sand: Retrospective Methods and Prospective Documentation in Transfer Pricing
Today,’’ 57 Tax L. Rev. 37, 43 & n.8 (2003).
48
P.L. 97-248, §213.
49
Durst & Culbertson, at 62. As indicated above and discussed
43
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bound’’ transfers under §367,50 and followed this in
1986 by adopting in the fabled Tax Reform Act of
1986 a comparable provision under §482.51
However, the development that triggered the ensuing events was not really the statutory enactments, but
rather the language of the Committee Reports behind
the 1986 Act. Durst and Culbertson recognize this, although they emphasize the language concerning congressional intent behind the superroyalty provisions.52
This language, however, has not proved to play too
decisive a role in subsequent developments, largely
because, as most commentators have conceded, the
manner in which the subsequent regulations were devised largely rendered both superroyalty provisions
nugatory.53 The key language was final language, first
appearing in the Ways and Means Committee’s report
in November 1985, directing the Treasury to conduct
a comprehensive study of intercompany pricing rules,
in which ‘‘careful consideration should be given to
whether the existing regulations could be modified in
any respect,’’ and recognizing that there were ‘‘serious other problems’’ with arm’s-length.54 The language was repeated verbatim by the Conference Committee report issued in May 1986.55

B. The Myth of Arm’s-Length: History
Shortly after the House Report was issued — a few
months before the Conference Report was prepared
and months before the conclusion of the Working
more fully below, the idea of continuity between these methods,
sanctioned by the mid-1990s compromises, and formula apportionment, has a longer history, and one with greater acquiescence
by major governments and the OECD, than is commonly acknowledged. See also, in this regard, the remarks of Deputy Treasury Secretary Larry Summers at a Treasury conference on formula apportionment held in December 1996, discussed below.
50
P.L. 98-369, §131. The ‘‘superroyalty’’ provisions demand
that income attributed to the transferor of an intangible transferred
abroad be ‘‘commensurate with the income’’ produced by the intangible. Thus, the ‘‘superroyalty’’ and the ‘‘commensurate with
income standard’’ generally mean the same thing in the contexts
of both §367 and §482.
51
P.L. 99-514.
52
Durst & Culbertson, at 63 & n. 93.
53
Brauner, ‘‘Value in the Eye of the Beholder: The Valuation
of Intangibles for Transfer Pricing Purposes,’’ 28 Va. Tax Rev. 79,
95, 127 (2008). On the Service’s search for the meaning of the
term over two decades after the enactment of the provision, see
‘‘IRS Trying to ‘Come to Grips’ with Commensurate with Income
Standard, Official Says,’’ 2007 TNT 107-7 (5/29/07) (statement of
IRS Associate Chief Counsel (International) Steven Musher to an
American Bar Association Section of Taxation meeting on May
11, 2007). The Associate Chief Counsel was discussing a Chief
Counsel Memorandum, which appears at 2007 TNT 58-22
(3/23/07), apparently suggesting that the superroyalty provision
does not permit ‘‘retrospective’’ adjustments; this concession as
much as says the provision has very little if any significance.
54
H.R. Rep. No. 99-426, at 424 (1985), reprinted in 1986-3
C.B. (vol. 2) 424.
55
H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 99-841, at II-637, reprinted in 1986-3
C.B. (vol. 4) 637.

Group recommendations for a ‘‘water’s edge’’ solution to the ‘‘problem’’ of state formulary apportionment systems — I published The Unitary Method and
the Myth of Arm’s-Length, a two-part study of the
arm’s-length system. The first part was historical, and
questioned the longstanding, widely repeated proposition — which I characterized as a ‘‘myth’’ — that
arm’s-length was some kind of universally recognized, international ‘‘norm.’’ The second was economic, and suggested that, in theory, arm’s-length was
defective, because organized multinational corporations do not behave ‘‘as if’’ they were a collection of
unrelated organizations dealing with each other at
‘‘arm’s length.’’ Both points, as articulated then, warrant brief restatement.
The historical part of the article began where David
Rosenbloom’s testimony, as well as his and my article
had left off: just as the actual history of transfer pricing began where the subject of those earlier pieces
had left off. The League of Nations evolved the ‘‘classification of assignment’’ principles throughout the
1920s and embodied them in the first ‘‘model conventions,’’ which were published in 1928. But they left
one subject out, for the reasons I tell my students
when I ask why the U.S. Constitution was drafted
without mentioning whether the Federal Government
would have the power to charter banks: not because
the subject wasn’t important enough to cover, but because it was too important. The allocation of profits of
an integrated enterprise was subject to a subsequent
study, over the period 1931–35,56 culminating in publication of a separate convention, which represented
the initial adoption of a ‘‘separate enterprise’’ or
‘‘separate accounting’’ standard over a ‘‘formula allocation’’ method.57 The rules of that convention were
integrated into two international model conventions of
the League in the 1940s, and are carried forward in
the later models of the OECD and United Nations.
1. Questioning the Status of the Norm
My 1986 article questioned both the impartiality of
the 1931–35 studies, and their degree of realism as to
the actual practices of states. It emphasized the largely
undemocratic nature of the process that generated the
supposed rules: the arm’s-length system was ‘‘nowhere statutory.’’ 58 And the absence of enforcement
of any rules in the wake of articulation of the principles: the taxation of international integrated enter56

Carroll, Taxation of Foreign and National Enterprises (Volume IV) — Methods of Allocating Taxable Income, League of Nations Document No. c.425(b).M.217(b).1933.11.A (9/30/33).
57
Fiscal Committee — Reports to the Council on the Work of
the Committee — Fifth Session, League of Nations Document
No. C.252.M.124.1935.II.A (June 17, 1935).
58
That situation has changed, at least since the reforms of the
1990s, if not since the OECD’s adoption of the mid-1960s United
States principles in the late 1970s. In the wake of these developments, some countries have enacted legislation embodying the
principles of the OECD Guidelines.
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prises was a ‘‘fiscal no man’s land.’’59 The article then
noted how this non-enforcement situation changed in
the 1960s, with the proposals that led to the Revenue
Act of 1962,60 and the adoption of the first comprehensive regulations in 1968.61 But it still questioned
the ‘‘norm status’’ of arm’s-length by noting that its
acceptance by foreign nations was largely the result of
an ‘‘export campaign’’ by Stanley Surrey, Assistant
Treasury Secretary for Tax Policy under the Kennedy/
Johnson Administration and before and later a Professor at Harvard Law School.62 Moreover, when efforts
were made to implement the system, the stated rules
of the 1960s reform did not work, and tax officials
more often than not had to resort to a ‘‘profit split’’
approach that resembled the fractional apportionment
approaches that had been adopted legislatively
(democratically) in some jurisdictions. Thus, the argument was that, even after articulation of the rules, the
system was still undemocratic, on one level, and
largely fictional, on another. And insofar as it degenerated in practice to a de facto fractional system, I described the ‘‘norm status’’ of fractional apportionment.
Professor Avi-Yonah’s historical account is not at
odds with this account, although it largely supplements it, rather than reinforces it. Professor AviYonah’s focus is on decisional law, and he tends to
equate arm’s-length with a system that relies upon
comparables to determine intracorporate allocations.
He shows that early decisions do not corroborate an
equation of the statutory language of §482 and its predecessors with the search for ‘‘comparables’’ which
he believes the regulations fasten to the ‘‘arm’s-length
standard.’’ But he then shows how, especially in the
wake of the adoption of the 1968 regulations, the
comparability idea begins to take over the judicial approach; and then demonstrates that, in the wake of
that development, the decisional law becomes a series
of ‘‘disasters’’ for the IRS. This largely corroborates:
(1) that at its foundation arm’s-length is an idea imposed from without the democratic process; and (2)
that it, with its comparability garb, was disutile and
degenerative.
The Durst & Culbertson account is also in accord
on the details, without any real emphasis, however, on
what I am calling here (though I never used the word
in 1986) the ‘‘undemocratic’’ quality of the standard.
But Durst & Culbertson actually echo some of the observations of the 1986 piece. On the ‘‘fiscal no man’s
land,’’ they say, ‘‘[a]s late as the early 1970’s, virtually no legislation addressed the issue outside the
United States, and ‘many . . . countries frankly admitted a wholesale lack of experience with the entire
problem.’ ’’ 63 And they do recognize that the emphasis on ‘‘comparables’’ in the 1960s regulations ‘‘might
59

Langbein, Unitary Method at 643–43.
Langbein, Unitary Method at 643–44.
61
Langbein, Unitary Method at 644–45.
62
Langbein, Unitary Method at 645–51.
63
Durst & Culbertson, at 46 & n.28, quoting Langbein, Uni60

appear surprising’’ in light of the nature of congressional action on the matter in 1961–1962.64 On the
degenerative property of the ‘‘comparability’’ system,
they note, with respect to the reported cases, that ‘‘[v]
irtually none of these cases ultimately was decided by
reference to comparables’’; but rather by ‘‘approximate determinations of the ‘reasonable’ returns to be
earned . . . or ‘reasonable’ percentages by which different parties to controlled transactions might ‘split’
their combined profits.’’ 65
2. The Question of the Origin of ‘‘Arm’s-Length’’
But there are two elements in Durst & Culbertson’s
account of the pre-1985 history with which I take issue, and they do seem to influence not only the subsequent analysis in the article itself, but the subsequent development of policy proposals by Durst, at
least, and others. The first concerns the origins of the
use of the separate enterprise system, which I quote
with added emphasis:
The apparent lack of interest in international
transfer pricing may reflect the relative difficulty that corporate management faced, until
relatively recently, in pricing intragroup transactions on terms other than those dictated by
the market even when they were inclined to
do so. Prior to the second half of the 20th century, large multinational groups existed, but
the transportation, communications, and data
management technologies necessary to operate them in a centralized fashion was far less
developed than it has become in more recent
years. Managements of even the most
forward-looking multinational groups were
compelled as a practical matter to leave pricing among different components of commonly
owned groups to the same self-organizing and
self-enforcing market mechanisms that determined pricing among entities that were not
commonly controlled. Thus, it seems highly
likely that, even among the constituents of
commonly controlled groups, market dynamics resulted in natural self-enforcement of a
situation tolerably corresponding to widely
held notions of ‘arm’s-length.’ 66
This is a description of historical propositions, and
one would expect that it would be substantiated by
historical reference. To it is appended a footnote, but
the footnote simply elaborates the speculation, with a
reference to an earlier, practical piece by Durst:
The management of a multinational entity
may have strong business reasons, entirely
tary Method at 640. As to Durst & Culbertson’s statement, I guess
I understand everything except the ‘‘outside the United States.’’
64
Durst & Culbertson at 54.
65
Durst & Culbertson at 59–60 (footnotes omitted).
66
Durst & Culbertson at 47 (emphasis added).
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unrelated to tax considerations, to price intragroup transactions at other than market prices.
In order to do so, however, the group’s management must have the ability to make and
enforce pricing decisions designed to benefit
the interests of the group as a whole, rather
than the separate interests of the group’s constituents. That is, management must have the
practical ability to manage the group in an effectively centralized manner, rather than in effect to delegate the function of determining
intragroup prices by permitting separate units
to operate largely independently and thus
regulate the group’s internal affairs through
market mechanisms. See generally Michael
C. Durst, Management vs. Tax Accounting in
Intercompany Transfer Pricing, 10 Tax Mgmt.
Transfer Pricing Rep. 909 (Mar. 6, 2002).67
As I say, these passages are not substantiated in any
way, and they are not insignificant. I do not believe
there is any truth to these assertions; there is no evidence from the pre–World War II, or the pre-1960s
postwar period, that there was any actual conformity
between how ‘‘management’’ allocated profits and
how they ‘‘would have been’’ allocated among unrelated parties. Paradoxically, even ironically, I think
precisely the opposite may be true, at least insofar as
Europe is concerned: Unrelated parties may have behaved like modern integrated enterprises, because interwar European business degenerated into a system
of market division and price fixing even among formally disaggregated entities. This is the system that
World War II destroyed, with the void filled at first by
the rising multinationalization of primarily U.S. enterprises entering through direct investment.68
Moreover, this point has been repeated in other
contexts, at least twice by Durst, and in the last instance joined by Professors Avi-Yonah and Clausing.69 And I do think the point is of more than historical interest, because it minimizes the institutional conflicts the transfer pricing issue appears to embody and
67

Durst & Culbertson at 47 & n. 32.
68
I realize I am here doing exactly what I say Culbertson/Durst
did: making historical assertions without substantiation. I am also
aware that I am in part corroborating those authors’ point, to the
extent I am suggesting that ‘‘in the old days’’ integrated and nonintegrated were similar (just that ‘‘in the old days’’ competition
was not what in retrospect it may be assumed to have been). But
my point here is not to make detailed assertions about ancient history, only to reinforce the point that arm’s-length not only does
not have, but never had, any solid theoretical grounding. And I do
think that point is important in formulating where one goes from
here on transfer pricing issues.
69
A-YDC at 503–04 & n.11; Durst Presentation, 123 Tax Notes
at 1272. The discussion in A-YDC is preceded by a statement that
‘‘[s]uch an approach might well have made sense eighty years
ago, when the legislative language underlying today’s arm’slength standard for income tax purposes was first developed.’’ To
this is attached footnote 11, citing my Unitary Method article,

to present, and in doing so, it underlies other conclusions that point to policy suggestions, or conclusions,
that may be harmful if not destructive. The point will
be clearer later.
3. The Nature of the Disputes of the 1960s
The second questionable part of the Durst & Culbertson historical account concerns their description
of the business community’s position in relation to the
congressional proposals of 1962, especially the House
Report’s proposal of a formula system. They note that
‘‘[b]usiness groups reacted vehemently to the House
proposals, pointing primarily to what they described
as the bill’s greatly excessive grant of discretionary
authority to enforcement officials,’’ 70 and proceed to
quote industry representatives’ objections based on
‘‘inequities,’’ ‘‘hardships,’’ ‘‘endless disputes,’’
‘‘bookkeeping requirements,’’ and ‘‘administrative
problems.’’ But they suggest ‘‘that some of the resistance might have resulted from the perceived revenue
implications of the House proposal,’’ which ‘‘did not
disguise its view that the proposed formulary approach would provide the Service with tools that
would permit more vigorous enforcement,’’ and
‘‘threatened to amount to a substantive tax increase on
a wide range of U.S. businesses.’’ 71
Again, this is a historical statement, again expressed in a conditional tense, and again it is speculative. And again it reflects a question that abides with
respect to transfer pricing: whether the fundamental
issue really is revenue. The 1962 proposal may have
‘‘threatened’’ a tax increase, but it did not constitute
one. Proposals, before and since, that have been much
more clearly tax increases have engendered considerably less ‘‘vehemence.’’ Again the suggestion is that
transparency, at least as much as tax burden, and potentially the general relationship between the polity, as
defined by constitutional norms, and the reality of
modern interest group power, are at least as great a
concern as tax burden by the unshakable adherents of
arm’s-length.

C. The Myth of Arm’s-Length: Theory
1. Coase/Williamson Organization Substitution
Theory
The second part of the 1986 article was theoretical,
and it has been by far the less controversial though
probably more influential part. It proceeded from
theoretical works of Ronald Coase, and later Oliver
Williamson, both now winners of the Nobel Prize in
Economics. Coase in 1937 postulated that there is a
Professor Avi-Yohah’s 2006 revision of his 1994 article; and the
Durst & Culbertson article. There is nothing in the Unitary
Method article, or anything else I have written (or thought) that
suggests I believe that the arm’s-length approach ever ‘‘made
sense’’ in the sense Durst & Culbertson and A-YCD suggest, and
I really do object to the citation.
70
Durst & Culbertson at 50.
71
Durst & Culbertson at 51 (emphasis added).
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process of substitution at the margin in the choice between markets and organization, and that the organization or form an economic context takes is shaped by
this process.72 Williamson elaborated on this with
ideas such as information impactedness: a seller of an
unknown technology cannot protect the value of its
right if it discloses its nature to a potential developer;
the potential developer cannot safely commit to the
cost of development without the very information it is
perilous for the seller to disclose. Hierarchical form
resolves the dilemma; the context will call forth integrated organization, rather than a series of individuated contracts.73
2. Internalization Theory
The Coase/Williamson approach lay at the foundation of the ‘‘internalization’’ theory of the multinational corporation.74 Multinationalization occurs because integrated organization ‘‘economizes’’ on
‘‘transaction costs’’: in the ‘‘information impactedness’’ example, the ‘‘costs’’ are the risks of information sharing without integrated control, which integrated control reduces if it does not eliminate. In particular, two forms of costs or risks are mitigated by
multinationalization: what might be called ‘‘appropriation’’ risk; and what might be called ‘‘debasement’’ risk. Appropriation risk relates principally to
what transfer pricing practitioners like to call ‘‘manufacturing intangibles’’: A protected or protectable process cannot be risklessly disclosed to a potential developer or distributor because of the risk of reverse
engineering or other form of appropriation.75 Debasement risk relates principally to what transfer pricing
practitioners like to call ‘‘marketing intangibles’’: An
entity with a valuable trade reputation must keep control of distributors or outlet to prevent them from using the name to promote cheaper or otherwise inferior
products or services.76
Internalization theory predicts the predominant patterns one encounters in transfer pricing practices, and
72
Coase, ‘‘The Nature of the Firm,’’ reprinted in American
Economic Association, Readings in Price Theory 331 (G. Stigler
& K. Boulding eds.) (1952). See Langbein, Unitary Method at
666–67.
73
Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust
Implications (1975). See Langbein, Unitary Method at 667–69.
74
Buckley & Casson, The Future of Multinational Enterprise
(1976); Dunning, ‘‘Explaining Changing Patterns of International
Production: In Defence of an Eclectic Theory,’’ 41 Oxford Bull.
Econ. & Stat. 269 (1979); Rugman, ‘‘Internalization and Nonequity Forms of International Involvement,’’ in New Theories of
the Multinational Enterprise (Alan M. Rugman ed. 1981). The
Buckley & Casson work is revised in Buckley & Casson, The
Multinational Enterprise Revisited: The Essential Buckley & Casson (2010).
75
See McManus, ‘‘The Theory of the International Firm,’’ in
The Multinational Firm and the Nation State (Gillis Paquet ed.
1972) at 81–84; Langbein, ‘‘Transaction Cost, Production Cost,
and Tax Transfer Pricing,’’ Tax Notes (9/18/89) at p. 1391, 1406
(discussing Eli Lilly Co. v. Comr., 856 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1988)).
76
See McManus, ‘‘The Theory of the International Firm,’’ in
The Multinational Firm and the Nation State (Gillis Paquet ed.
1972) at 81–84; Langbein, ‘‘Transaction Cost, Production Cost,

suggests the infirmity of arm’s-length as an idea. First,
the ‘‘displacement’’ theory at the root of Coase’s description predicts the difficulty of finding ‘‘comparables’’; an economic context whose optimum form of
organization is integration is unlikely to co-exist with
any context organized by individuated contracts. Second, when one resorts to what I called in 1986 a
‘‘single component method’’ — the resale price and
cost-plus methods, at the time, the comparable profits
method now — one generates a ‘‘continuum price’’
problem. A relatively low price is the ‘‘downstream’’
(seller’s) break-even price; while a relatively high
price is the ‘‘upstream’’ (buyer’s) price. So any price
in between will bring both parties into the transaction,
and one has an analytical basis for picking any price
along that continuum, but no analytical basis for selecting among them.
Moreover, internalization theory predicts the central role ‘‘intangible’’ property is apt to play in transfer pricing disputes. Both appropriation and debasement risks relate to the existence of valuable ‘‘intangibles.’’ These ‘‘intangibles,’’ indeed, may not be
property at all, in that they may not be severable from
the total, integrated business within which they are
used.77
The Coase/Williamson concepts were formulated,
and first applied, in the context of antitrust law, to
demonstrate the various forms, mostly of vertical, corporate integration were not necessarily harmful and
should not necessarily be the target of antitrust enforcement. They also were applied to demonstrate that
some forms of (mostly congolomerate) integration
might be more harmful than otherwise supposed. But
those concepts are applicable in the tax context to
suggest that some way of accomplishing intercorporate allocations needs to be found that does not rely
on useless arm’s-length principles.
These economic arguments are, as Professor AviYonah states, by now well enough known that they do
not ordinarily warrant restatement. They have never
been refuted; indeed, as a wide number of observers
have frequently noted,78 they have never even really
been answered. But they do not solve the allocation
problem for one reason, and they have not destroyed
the arm’s-length idea, for another. They do not solve
the allocation problem because they do not convincingly suggest an alternative to arm’s-length; they
and Tax Transfer Pricing,’’ Tax Notes (9/18/89) at p. 1391, 1405–
06.
77
Langbein, ‘‘Transaction Cost, Production Cost, and Tax
Transfer Pricing,’’ Tax Notes (9/18/89) at p. 1391, 1407–09.
78
See, e.g., Lepard, ‘‘Is the United States Obligated to Drive
on the Right? A Multidisciplinary Inquiry into the Normative Authority of Contemporary International Law Using the Arm’s
Length Standard as a Case Study,’’ 10 Duke J. Contemp. & Int’l
Law 43 (1999); Wickham & Kerester, ‘‘New Directions Needed
for Solution of the International Transfer Pricing Tax Puzzle: Internationally Agreed Rules or Tax Warfare?’’ 56 Tax Notes 339,
348 (7/20/92); Kauder, ‘‘The Unspecified Federal Tax Policy of
Arm’s Length: A Comment on the Continuing Vitality of Formulary Apportionment at the Federal Level,’’ Tax Notes (8/23/93) at
p. 1147.
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merely suggest that the comparability-based arm’slength idea is doomed. They have not destroyed the
arm’s-length idea, because, as I have stressed throughout, and as others have noted, the adherents of arm’slength are vehement and intransigent. Indeed, in the
face of the elaboration of these ideas, that adherence
can be properly, even calmly, characterized as mindless. And that mindlessness cannot be ascribed to concerns about revenue alone. Revenue, after all, is only
money.

IV. COGNITIVE CAPTURE: THE
BUITER PRESENTATION

about its pain, what its pain means for the
economy at large and what the Fed ought to
do about it. Wall Street’s pain was great indeed — deservedly so in many cases. Wall
Street engaged in special pleading by exaggerating the impact on the wider economy of
the rapid deleveraging (contraction of the size
of the balance sheets) that was taking place.
Wall Street wanted large rate cuts fast to assist it in its solvency repairs, not just to improve its liquidity, and Wall Street wanted the
provision of ample liquidity against overvalued collateral. Why did Wall Street get what
it wanted?
Throughout the 12 months of the crisis, it is
difficult to avoid the impression that the Fed
is too close to the financial markets and leading financial institutions, and too responsive
to their special pleadings, to make the right
decisions for the economy as a whole. Historically, the same behaviour has characterised the Greenspan Fed. It came as something
of a surprise to me that the Bernanke Fed, if
not quite a clone of the Greenspan Fed, displays the same excess sensitivity to Wall
Street concerns.
****
Both the 1998 LTCM and the January 21/22,
2008 episodes suggest that the Fed has been
co-opted by Wall Street — that the Fed has
effectively internalised the objectives, concerns, world view and fears of the financial
community. This socialisation into a partial
and often distorted perception of reality is unhealthy and dangerous.
It can be called cognitive regulatory capture
(or cognitive state capture), because it is not
achieved by special interests buying, blackmailing or bribing their way towards control
of the legislature, the executive, or some important regulator or agency, like the Fed, but
instead through those in charge of the relevant
state entity internalising, as if by osmosis, the
objectives, interests and perception of reality
of the vested interest they are meant to regulate and supervise in the public interest.80

The general reaction to the views expressed in the
1986 article — both the challenge to the status of
arm’s-length as an ‘‘international norm,’’ and the challenge to its economic rationality — can be seen as a
species of what Willem Buiter, in a presentation to the
2008 Jackson Hole conference sponsored annually by
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, called ‘‘cognitive regulatory capture,’’ or, more
darkly, ‘‘cognitive state capture.’’ The notion is a refinement of longstanding notions of public choice
theory of ‘‘regulatory’’ or ‘‘state capture’’ — the
theory that because of the greater concern of regulated
interests as opposed to the diffuse concern of the body
politic at large, the regulated concerns come to dominate regulatory policy. The Buiter paper, presented in
August 2008 — after the onset of the financial crisis,
but immediately before it reached its zenith in September 2008 — was critical of Federal Reserve
policy, with emphasis on two phases of policy. The
first was the conduct of interest rate policy, especially
in the 2007–08 period, which Buiter believed exhibited excessive concern for the impact of interest rate
changes on asset prices, especially stock prices, with
particularly harsh criticism for the ‘‘panic cut’’ intermeeting, on January 22, 2008; Buiter suggested there
was reality to the notion of a ‘‘Greenspan-Bernanke
put.’’ The second emphasis was bailouts by the Board,
including the 1998 Long-Term Capital Management
(LTCM) bailout and the more recent, much more dramatic March 2008 bailout of Bear Stearns, when, in
Buiter’s words, ‘‘the Fed maximised moral hazard and
adverse selection.’’ Buiter suggested these bailouts occurred when ‘‘obviously superior alternatives were
available — and not just with the benefit of hindsight.’’ 79
His explanation was an idea he defined as ‘‘cognitive capture’’:
I believe a key reason is that the Fed listens
to Wall Street and believes what it hears; at
any rate, the Fed acts as if it believes what
Wall Street tells it. Wall Street tells the Fed

What is surprising is that this ‘‘internalization,’’ as
if by process of osmosis, in the contemporary period,

79
Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises, Discussion Paper No. 619, Sept. 2008, p. 104, available at http://
moneynews.com/StreetTalk/marc-faber-gold-bernanke/2010/
04/26/id/356860?s=al&promo_code=9CE9-1 (last visited Apr. 26,
2010).

80
Buiter, Central Banks and Financial Crises, Discussion Paper No. 619, Sept. 2008, p. 107–09, available at http://
moneynews.com/StreetTalk/marc-faber-gold-bernanke/2010/
04/26/id/356860?s=al&promo_code=9CE9-1 (last visited Apr. 26,
2010) (emphasis added).
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and the period since the onset of the ‘‘transfer pricing
wars,’’ not only afflicts the defenders of arm’s-length,
within and without the governments of the various nations, but that it has a dominating influence on even
the contemporary advocates of fractional apportionment. The influence is visible in a couple of instances
cited above, in the recounting of the pre-1985 history:
the emphasis on revenue, rather than transparency and
general power relations, in explaining business opposition to the 1962 deferral/apportionment proposals;
the implication that in its origin arm’s-length bore
some degree of economic rationality in terms of how
integrated organizations operated, as opposed to the
function of arm’s-length as a means of encroaching on
the domain of public institutions, which has been the
real purpose of the principle all along.
This ‘‘cognitive capture’’ also seems to condition
the account given of the ‘‘wars’’ of the 1985–95 period, when, as explained below, Durst & Culbertson in
particular accept a characterization that emphasizes
the more narrow and nationalistic aspects of the U.S.
position, and minimizes the idealistic public policy
orientation of the more patient and impartial critics of
arm’s-length.

V. THE TREASURY WHITE PAPER
AND ‘‘NET INCOME
BENCHMARKING’’
In October 1988, the Treasury issued its ‘‘White
Paper’’ on transfer pricing, its report in response to
the mandate in the House and Conference Reports on
the 1986 legislation.81 The first part described background: the pre-1986 experience with transfer pricing;
administrative problems; the problem of finding comparables; and the alternative ‘‘methods’’ developed in
the case law. The second part discussed the 1986
statutory change, the ‘‘commensurate with income’’
standard, first generally, then in terms of compatibility with international standards; then the question of
‘‘periodic adjustments’’; and finally the question of
safe harbors. The final part discussed alternatives and
variations on arm’s-length. The first chapter in this
part (Chapter 10 of the White Paper) discussed economic theories, with focus on critical arguments based
on the nature of modern integrated enterprises. The
second described, based on this analysis, a ‘‘basic
arm’s-length return method’’ (BALRM), which basically foreshadowed the current comparable profits
method (CPM) or transactional net profits method
(TNPM), with what the White Paper characterized as
a ‘‘profit split’’ addition. The final two chapters discussed cost sharing.

A. The White Paper Economic
Analysis
Throughout, the White Paper claimed fidelity to the
arm’s-length principle. Its chapter on the ‘‘commensu81

A Study of Intercompany Pricing Under Section 482 of the
Code, Notice 88-123, 1988-2 C.B. 458.

rate with income’’ standard ‘‘concludes that the arm’slength standard is the accepted international norm for
making transfer pricing adjustments,’’ and ‘‘reaffirms
that Congress intended the commensurate with income standard to be consistent with the arm’s-length
standard, and that it will be so interpreted and applied
by the Internal Revenue Service and the Treasury Department.’’ 82 Its chapter on theory ‘‘examines these
arguments and concludes that the market-based arm’slength standard remains the better theoretical allocation method.’’
But, as Durst and Culbertson note, there was considerable tension between these professions and the
underlying analysis of the Paper: ‘‘the White Paper
seems to reflect an understanding of the arm’s-length
standard that departed radically from the conception
that, at the time, was the basis of most peoples’ understanding of the phrase’’; ‘‘both the economic analysis
presented in the White Paper, and the methods that the
White Paper offered in reliance on this analysis, constituted a fundamental challenge to the notion that effective transfer pricing administration can be based
primarily on reference to uncontrolled comparables’’;83 ‘‘it is clear that BALRM represented an important conceptual shift from prior governmental formulations of the arm’s length standard . . . the first
governmental effort to incorporate into transfer pricing rules the specific recognition of the behavior of integrated groups, and in particular to come to grips
with the likelihood that transactional comparables often will not be available’’;84 ‘‘even the partial economic analysis offered by the White Paper gave ample
motivation to suggest what critics soon labeled as
radical departures from the arm’s length standard as it
previously had been conceived.’’ 85
This question of labeling would persist: Professor
Avi-Yonah later would relegate arm’s-length to the
idea of strict reliance on comparables; he and others
would talk of a continuum, with arm’s-length based
exclusively on comparables at one end, and formula
apportionment at the other.86 The matter is an important one, as commitment to ‘‘arm’s-length’’ continues
to be the touchstone of lingering opposition by business groups and some government officials, here and
abroad, to considering more far-reaching reform of
the transfer pricing system. But my focus here is on
the Durst & Culbertson account of this history of
these ‘‘wars,’’ and more particularly on how that account (and the underlying history) are shaping contemporary approaches to the problem. And it seems
that the dialecticism of the ways the question of the
White Paper’s approach is framed can obscure important details about what actually happened (and what
the questions are today).
82

Id. at 5–6.
Durst & Culbertson at 66.
84
Durst & Culbertson at 73.
85
Durst & Culbertson at 69.
86
Again, there are questions about the origins of this notion of
a ‘‘continuum,’’ and about how persuasive it may ever be to communities who have listened little to logic in the past.
83
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B. Durst-Culbertson Interpretation and
‘‘Net Income Benchmarking’’
Durst and Culbertson appear to view the White Paper’s economic analysis, and the critique of arm’slength that such analysis at least partially accepts, as
inextricably linked to what they say was the ‘‘heart’’
of the White Paper proposals, the BALRM, and a concept (or approach) they seem to regard as indistinguishable from BALRM, which they call ‘‘net income
benchmarking.’’ In fairness, Durst and Culbertson acknowledge that a reductionist association of BALRM
and ‘‘net income benchmarking’’ was in part a product of developments that intervened between the
White Paper and the issuance of the first U.S. proposed regulations in January 1992.87 But they also
seem to interpret the White Paper inaccurately, in
ways that may be attributable to the subsequent developments more than to what the White Paper actually
says.
Durst and Culbertson suggest that the White Paper’s treatment of profit splits is ‘‘brief’’; that ‘‘in
conceptual format it is surprising’’; that the ‘‘White
Paper treats the profit split approach as mainly an extension of the limited-risk BALRM approach’’; that
the discussion is titled ‘‘Profit Split Addition to the
Basic Arm’s Length Return Method’’; that the ‘‘the
discussion begins by suggesting that profit split
should apply only in unusual cases, when the more
generally applicable BALRM approach does not
prove sufficient’’; and that ‘‘[b]y treating the profit
split approach as a special case of the limited risk
model, the White Paper would appear to have reversed the sequence of analysis that the White Paper’s
overall conception of commonly controlled groups
would appear most naturally to suggest.’’ They say
that ‘‘[i]f one accepts the model of an integrated enterprise as a joint economic venture over which the
different participants are essentially free to shape their
mutual arrangements in any manner that seems most
efficient,’’ then ‘‘it is the profit split that suggests itself as the generally applicable model, with the onesided paradigm of BALRM, in which all risks and entrepreneurial activity are contained in a central entity,
as a special case.’’ 88 It is true, too, that ‘‘the White
Paper offered no particular method for dividing the residual income,’’ and ‘‘described the problem as ‘difficult.’ ’’ 89
It is emphatically true that an emphasis on the
BALRM over the profit split method would ‘‘reverse
the sequence’’ of the ‘‘overall conception’’ offered by
the critique of arm’s-length, and equally true that the
White Paper was painfully inexplicit in relying on
‘‘judgment’’ to effect a residual profit split.90 But I am
not sure that, at least in its original conception, the
87

INTL-0372-88; INTL-0401-88, 57 Fed. Reg. 3571 (1/30/92).
Durst & Culbertson at 73.
89
Durst & Culbertson at 74.
90
See, to the same effect, Langbein, ‘‘Transaction Cost, Production Cost, and Tax Transfer Pricing,’’ Tax Notes (9/18/89) at p.
1391, 1413.
88

White Paper did in fact ‘‘reverse the sequence.’’ For
one thing, while the discussion of the ‘‘profit split’’ is
brief, and is suggested as an ‘‘addition,’’ the White
Paper can be read as conceding that reliance on that
method might be extensive, and even central to a revised transfer pricing system. As Durst and Culbertson concede, both the underlying critique of arm’slength, and the White Paper, conceded a continuing
role for the use of comparables; similarly, the critique
of arm’s-length recognizes there are circumstances
where an assignment of ‘‘marginal’’ profits to functional components will complete the pricing determination. But the critique of arm’s-length also suggests
that both these sets of cases will be easier cases — it
is the truly difficult cases, involving the largest
amounts of revenue, that will call for the use of a
profit split. There is really nothing in the White Paper
that is inconsistent with this position.

C. The Theoretical Critique of
Arm’s-Length and ‘‘Net Income
Benchmarking’’
There, rather, may be alternative explanations for
the White Paper’s apparent emphasis on BALRM
over profit splits. There are two such explanations,
and I think they are mutually exclusive, even incompatible with each other. On the one hand, because
profit splits bear a much closer resemblance to fractional apportionment than does the ‘‘marginal’’
component-reform analysis, as subsequent literature
has made ever clearer,91 the White Paper may have
been shy about suggesting profit splits as a central el91
A-YCD at 498 (Proposed formula apportionment ‘‘system is
similar in significant respects to the current ‘‘residual profit split’’
method of the U.S. transfer pricing regulations and the OECD
Guidelines, as well as to the current method that U.S. states use to
allocate national income across states.’’); Avi-Yonah, ‘‘The Rise
and Fall of Arm’s Length: A Study in the Evolution of U.S. International Taxation,’’ 15 Va. Tax Rev. 89, 158–59 (1995). The notion of a ‘‘continuum’’ of arm’s-length and formula apportionment
is sometimes attributed to Professor Avi-Yonah’s 1995 article, but
its true source is a report of an invitational conference on transfer
pricing held under OECD auspices at the Chateau Esclimont near
Chartres, France, in July 2003. The passage is quoted by Professor Avi-Yonah, who notes that the meeting was attended by officials of the U.S. Treasury, United Kingdom Inland Revenue, the
Fiscal Affairs Division of the OECD, and the Japanese National
Tax Administration, although it was attended by private practitioners as well:

[T]he arm’s length principle and formulary apportionment should not be seen as polar extremes; rather, they
should be viewed as part of a continuum of methods
ranging from [CUP] to predetermined formulas. It is not
clear where the arm’s length principle ceases and formulary apportionment begins, and it is counterproductive
and unimportant to attempt to apply labels to the methods.
(Arnold and McDonnell, ‘‘Report on the Invitational
Conference on Transfer Pricing; the Allocation of In-
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ement of transfer pricing reform. Alternatively, as
many of the forces to which Durst and Culbertson attribute the ultimate emphasis on ‘‘net income benchmarking’’ may suggest were already at work at the
time the White Paper was written, the emphasis on
BALRM may have already reflected a plan to use
come and Expenses Among Countries,’’ Tax Notes
(12/13/93) at p. 1377, 1381.)
Professor Avi-Yonah omits the paragraph preceding this in the
Arnold/McConnell report, which, at the risk of violating the confidentiality commitments we as participants in the conference all
made, I must emphasize was the most important passage in the
entire report:
[T]he arm’s length principle and formulary apportionment should not be seen as polar extremes. Formulary
apportionment has a bad reputation, largely for political
reasons, and the group tried to get beyond the labels
and the mythology. There seemed to be a consensus in
favor of encouraging further research on formulary apportionment methods, especially with respect to their
practical application. There was some disagreement,
however, about whether encouragement in the form of
sponsorship from international organizations, such as
the OECD, was necessary or appropriate.
(Arnold and McDonnell, ‘‘Report on the Invitational
Conference on Transfer Pricing; the Allocation of Income and Expenses Among Countries,’’ Tax Notes
(12/13/93) at p. 1377, 1381 (emphasis added).)
I cannot fault Professor Avi-Yonah for the quotation of the one
passage and not the other; I believe I reviewed and commented on
an earlier draft of the 1994 article without mentioning the point.
However, in part I did not mention it because the proceedings on
which Arnold and McDonnell reported were confidential. But the
ascription of the ‘‘continuum’’ idea to Professor Avi-Yonah, and
not to the invitational conference, in subsequent literature, is not
a minor matter of according credit for a notion: rather, it is suggestive of some of the themes I am emphasizing throughout, and
the quotation of the second passage underscores this.
For it is abundantly clear that there is overt contradiction between the conciliatory tone reached at the invitational conference,
attended by OECD representatives and indeed held under OECD
auspices, and the harsh language adopted in the Guidelines condemning formula apportionment. The sharp departure can be
taken as a betrayal, especially given the pledge of confidentiality
made by attendees at the conference, and the action of the OECD
member governments in so betraying a sensible compromise can
honestly be characterized as dictatorial.
The episode illumines both of the more general concepts I attempt to introduce in this paper. The persistent ascription of the
idea to Professor Avi-Yonah is a form of ‘‘cognitive capture’’: It
treats the idea as an original notion of an isolated academic, when
in fact it was a consensus of experts that include government experts, and was tied to consensus about further study and strong
support for offıcial further study. And the hauteur of the OECD
and its Member States in deep-sixing a carefully and patiently
wrought agreement represents the ‘‘rhenification’’ of free enterprise at its worst.

transfer pricing reform to enforce a form of ‘‘net income benchmarking.’’
In any event, whether either of these explanations
— or any other — holds, my point here is that there
is a clear disjunction between the underlying critique
of arm’s-length and the notion of net income benchmarking. This point is quite important. Durst and Culbertson tend to obscure it in their subsequent discussion; in any event, they treat the subsequent development of the ‘‘wars’’ as largely a contest between
arm’s-length retention, on the one hand, and net income benchmarking, on the other. And even to the extent they do not so treat the issues, business and foreign governments have, with their attack on the proposed U.S. reforms.
This treatment is erroneous, however, because after
the White Paper, the ‘‘reform’’ side of the ‘‘wars’’ proceeded along two separate tracks. The first, hesitantly
pursued by the government, professed continuing allegiance to arm’s-length, but in one form or another
advanced net income benchmarking. The second became a largely academic enterprise of trying to move
from theory to a concrete proposed revision of the
system that would be both workable and that had a
chance of worldwide adoption within a space of 10
years.
Durst and Culbertson describe three circumstances
as leading to the resolution, or degeneration, of the
White Paper position into one defending ‘‘net income
benchmarking.’’ The first was the IRS’s continuing
defeats in the Tax Court in its effort to advance a
‘‘contract manufacturing’’ theory under existing regulations.92 The second was the dispute over California’s use of the unitary method, which Durst and Culbertson suggest ‘‘contributed in an impressionistic
way to an identification of formulary approaches with
aggressive and arguably unfair governmental enforcement efforts,’’ such that ‘‘the word ‘formulary’ became something of a shibboleth.’’ 93 The third — and
by far the most important — was the ‘‘expansion’’ of
‘‘the scope of political concern over transfer pricing
enforcement . . . beyond its traditional focus on outbound migrations of business activities from the
United States to situations involving the distribution
of tangible products in the United States.’’ The center
of concern was with Japanese exporters, and a ‘‘perceived . . . tendency of the U.S. distribution subsidiaries of foreign (often Japanese) manufacturers to earn
persistently low levels of income, or losses, from their
U.S. operations.’’ 94
This led to ‘‘serious proposals for the imputation of
minimum levels of taxable income for foreign-owned
subsidiaries, in apparent contravention of international tax norms,’’ and to ‘‘a brief period of notoriety’’
92

Sundstrand Corp. v. Comr., 96 T.C. 226 (1991); Bauch &
Lomb, Inc. v. Comr., 92 T.C. 525 (1989), aff’d, 933 F.2d 1084 (2d
Cir. 1991).
93
Durst & Culbertson at 78.
94
Durst & Culbertson at 78.
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for transfer pricing ‘‘in the general press as an issue
in the 1992 U.S. presidential campaign.’’ 95
Moreover, according to Durst and Culbertson, the
ultimate resolution of the ‘‘wars’’ indicated that some
form of ‘‘net income benchmarking’’ — as opposed to
articulation of a longer range, more general and theoretically sound approach — had become the objective
of U.S. bargaining in connection with the issuance of
the final U.S. regulations and the OECD Guidelines:
The two documents [U.S. final regulations
and OECD Guidelines] reflect a compromise
between the United States and its trading partners. The OECD Guidelines acknowledged
the acceptability of measures based on net as
opposed to gross income. They did so however, based on the U.S.’s retreat from the
broader implications of the White Paper’s
BALRM. That retreat took the form of the increasing deference in the regulations to notions of comparability.96

VI. THE DURST-CULBERTSON
INTERPRETATION AND THE
‘‘TRANSFER PRICING WARS’’
The ultimate question here concerns how the mid1990s revisions have worked out, and what that says
about the eventual or ultimate fate of arm’s-length.
Before turning to that question, I believe it worth
mentioning, and surveying briefly, three facets of the
‘‘war’’ that I believe Durst and Culbertson do not address either adequately or correctly. All three matters
exert continuing influence on the continuing debate.

A. Oversimplification of the Critique
of Arm’s-Length
The first area grows out of what I adverted to
above: the oversimplification of equating the critique
of arm’s-length with the notion of net income benchmarking. More than three years elapsed between the
issuance of the White Paper (October 1988) and the
first U.S. proposed regulations (January 1992). During
that time, academic critics of arm’s-length were neither inert nor supportive of the half-hearted (or lefthanded) embrace of that critique by the White Paper.
In a 1989 paper — which was as widely ignored as
the 1986 paper was celebrated — I sought to go beyond the naked proposition, articulated in the 1986
paper, other literature, and the White Paper, that the
idea of economies of integration vitiated the arm’slength notion by inquiring into the precise nature of
those economies and into what that nature might inform us as to the proper rules we might devise.
As suggested above, that paper largely concluded
that there were two predominant kinds of ‘‘transaction
95
96

Durst & Culbertson at 79.
Durst & Culbertson at 88–89 (footnotes omitted).

costs’’ on which integration economizes. The first are
‘‘appropriation’’ risks, the ‘‘information impactedness’’ idea: a party with a valuable (usually technological) idea, which needed an ‘‘outlying’’ party to exploit in a foreign jurisdiction, cannot costlessly disclose the idea to the other party, because of the risk
the latter will appropriate the idea. The ‘‘outlying’’
party, at the same time, cannot commit resources to
exploiting the idea without being in a position to
evaluate for itself the potential value of the idea. Integrated form permits the two parties to work together
without suffering the first party to risk appropriation,
or the second to risk waste or exploitation.
The second kind of risks on which integration
economizes are ‘‘debasement’’ risks. A party with a
valuable intangible (e.g., trade name) cannot risk
‘‘contracting’’ or ‘‘licensing’’ the name to an ‘‘outlying’’ party without the ability to control that party’s
use of the name, lest that party use the name in a way
that enhances its own return, whether in the short or
long run, at the expense of diminishing or destroying
the value of the name universally.
These notions can be invoked in articulating notions of ‘‘where’’ income is earned, in possibly surprising ways, and ways that influence concepts of the
right to tax. Where integration addresses ‘‘appropriation’’ risks, this analysis implies that some of the ‘‘income’’ earned in a ‘‘satellite’’ location belongs to a
place of ‘‘origin.’’ Suppose what is at issue is a valuable patent, developed in Country A and embedded in
a product sold in Country B. The Country B component is integrated so that the value created by the
Country A component is not wholly ‘‘appropriated’’
— the implication is that some of the ‘‘profit’’ apparently derived in Country B appropriately ‘‘belongs’’ to
Country A. This is not a surprising conclusion, as it is
the analysis that underlies the search for a ‘‘royalty’’
(or ‘‘superroyalty’’) for intangible property, imputing
profit to a ‘‘home’’ country.
Where integration addresses ‘‘debasement’’ risks,
the analysis is a bit subtler. In the appropriation context, integration minimizes the ‘‘take’’ of the component in the ‘‘host’’ or ‘‘satellite’’ country, but does not
diminish the before-transaction-cost earnings: Integration simply ensures that the home country component
gets its fair share. In the debasement context, the idea
really is that, by debasing, the host country component could earn a greater before-transaction-cost return if it were not restrained by the home country
component. But the home component restrains the
take in order to protect the returns to the ‘‘intangible’’
(the reputation) worldwide. In other words, any given
satellite or host country really should get some sort of
fee from the home country and other satellite country
components, to compensate for its relinquishment of
the opportunity to debase.
This analysis forms some theoretical basis for a formula allocation regime, on the assumption that any
precise estimation of the ‘‘deemed’’ payments due
would be impossible. Where ‘‘appropriation’’ risks are
at issue, a portion of the ‘‘residual’’ profit (owing to
and protected by integration) should inure to the capital investment made by the components of the enter-
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prise, mostly the home component. Where ‘‘debasement’’ risks are at issue, a portion of the residual profit
should inure to the place or places where sales take
place. In the former case, the return is the gain that in
the absence of integration would be appropriated; in
the latter, the return is the gain a debaser could earn
but foregoes to protect the business reputation.
This might suggest a two-part regime, where the residual is allocated to the home country where ‘‘production’’ or ‘‘manufacturing’’ intangibles are involved, or are allocated on the basis of assets; where
a ‘‘marketing’’ intangible is involved, the residual is
allocated to satellite countries, or allocated entirely on
the basis of sales. In a 1991 paper presented at the
University of Michigan, I rejected any such idea in favor of a unified system where the residual is allocated
50% on the basis of assets and 50% on the basis of
sales.97 I have been consistently critical of the effort,
suggested and promoted, if not mandated, by arm’slength, to ‘‘comminute’’ income of an integrated enterprise into income from identifiable items of intangible property. My sense is that the ‘‘residual’’ is more
properly viewed, in Marshallian terms, as a return to
organization itself. Indeed, in most high-profit situations, there will be a linked ‘‘manufacturing’’ intangible and ‘‘marketing’’ intangible (the Coca-Cola formula, and the Coca-Cola and Coke trademarks; the
Lipitor drug and the trade name, etc.). Thus, it seems
a unified formula, uniformly applied would best approximate the reality of ‘‘economies of integration.’’
But the existence of this scholarship and these ideas
are not acknowledged in the Durst & Culbertson account of the ‘‘transfer pricing wars.’’

B. Arm’s-Length and Comparable
‘‘Arrangements’’
1. The Profit Split and Cost Sharing Methods
This first matter I say Durst and Culbertson address
poorly is one they virtually ignore; the second is one
I feel they overemphasize. This concerns the possibility of reformulating arm’s-length so that it is directed
not so much as a search for ‘‘transactions’’ that were
‘‘uncontrolled’’ and ‘‘comparable,’’ but rather for intercompany ‘‘arrangements’’ that are ‘‘uncontrolled’’
and ‘‘comparable.’’ Durst & Culbertson refer to this in
connection with their discussion of the drafting of the
1968 regulations, as to which they note a ‘‘lack of reference to the notion of an agreement among commonly controlled entities,’’ and suggest that may have
reflected ‘‘an understandable lack of familiarity with
the behavior of commonly controlled entities which,
in the mid-1960’s, had made their way only recently
into the economic literature.’’ 98 They stress the point
in their discussion of the White Paper, and that Paper’s treatment of the profit split and cost sharing
methods:
97
Langbein, ‘‘A Modified Fractional Apportionment Proposal
for Tax Transfer Pricing,’’ Tax Notes (2/10/92) at pp. 719.
98
Durst & Culbertson at 57.

Missing from the White Paper, however, are:
(1) a discussion of the dramatic contrast between the cost sharing model and traditional
conceptions of retrospective enforcement of
transfer pricing rules by reference to comparables, (2) consideration of why cost sharing
by 1988 had persisted in the body of U.S.
transfer pricing law for more than 20 years,
despite its lack of conformity with the approach followed elsewhere in the law, and (3)
most importantly, any consideration of
whether the cost sharing model might suggest
ways in which the arm’s length standard
might be applied more satisfactorily.
The White Paper’s omission of such discussion is particularly unfortunate in light of the
fact that cost sharing, unlike other approaches
with arguably formulaic characteristics, generally had been a creature of the taxpayer
community and was (and remains) popular.
Moreover, although the tempers of many participants in the transfer pricing debate already
had been substantially inflamed, the White
Paper was written at a time when the debate
had not yet rigidified into a pattern under
which any approach not depending heavily on
uncontrolled comparables was automatically
viewed as an attempt at heightened U.S. enforcement and therefore seen by many with
suspicion.99
This suggestion — that arm’s-length may be redeemed by treating it as an evaluation of business
forms rather than an ex post examination of transactions — appears with some frequency, almost always
advanced by defenders of arm’s-length. Indeed, it appears in skeleton form in the proposed and final regulations issued in the 1990s, and the OECD Guidelines,
in the guise of the rule that ‘‘comparability’’ depends
upon similarity of ‘‘contractual form’’ between the examined party and any proffered comparable, as well
as in the notion of a ‘‘comparable profit split’’
method. Indeed, even my 1989 article considers the
notion in connection with examining how substitution
of different business organization forms occurs, and
can generate rules for profit allocation.100
However, the suggestion ultimately fails. To be fair,
even Durst and Culbertson do not offer it as a cure for
what ails arm’s-length; they lament principally that
the idea was not advanced more thoughtfully by the
White Paper or otherwise early in the 1986–95 debate
on transfer pricing. The problem is a resurfacing of
the problem of comparability: Just as market-contract
forms are displaced by integrated organization, and
99

Durst & Culbertson at 75 (footnote omitted).
Langbein, ‘‘Transaction Cost, Production Cost, and Tax
Transfer Pricing,’’ Tax Notes (9/18/89) at p. 1391, 1411–12.
100
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the two appear in different settings, so too do intermediate forms (e.g., partnerships or alliances) respond to
different market situations, and consequently a disaggregated ‘‘alliance’’ is likely to exist in settings in
which full integration does not occur. It is true that the
two devices that were elevated by the 1995 regulations and Guidelines (and suggested by the 1982
amendments to §936), the profit split and cost sharing
methods, can be seen as measures that base prices on
‘‘intermediate’’ forms of business cooperation. But
neither expressly or in operation depends as such on
comparables. The comparable profit split method of
the regulations, as I have argued elsewhere,101 is almost never explicitly used, and really will never be
applicable except where one of the other
comparability-based methods is also available, and in
those circumstances the other method will almost always be easier to employ.
2. Difficulties with Cost Sharing
Moreover, there are theoretical difficulties in citing
those two methods as a defense of arm’s-length
against formulary alternatives. The cost sharing
method is, it is true, popular with the taxpayer community; but that has been so largely because the
method is subject to abuse, and extensive tax avoidance.102 Changes to the regulations proposed in
2005103 and promulgated as temporary regulations in
early 2009 addressed some of the difficulties, and correspondingly reduced the popularity of the method.104
Most particularly, the cost sharing method presents
problems of ‘‘buy-in’’ arrangements that simply replicate many of the difficulties of the comparabilitybased methods.105 The profit split method, by contrast, is widely used, though perhaps not so widely as
a strict interpretation of the regulations and Guidelines governing the other methods would warrant. But
its use does not, as intimated above, rest on analysis
of quasi-integrated arrangements of ‘‘comparable’’
firms, but rather on a priori stipulation of criteria to
be used in making the profit split. In this regard, it is,
as Professor Avi-Yonah and others have frequently
noted,106 more akin to a formulary method than to any
species of arm’s-length.

C. The Question of Politics
The final matter that I believe Durst and Culbertson
treat inadequately concerns the political ramifications
101

Langbein, ‘‘Transfer Pricing and the Outsourcing Problem,’’
106 Tax Notes 1299 (3/14/05).
102
See generally Benshalom, ‘‘Sourcing the ‘Unsourceable’:
The Cost Sharing Regulations and the Sourcing of Affiliated
Intangible-Related Transactions,’’ 26 Va. Tax Rev. 79 (2007).
103
70 Fed. Reg. 51116 (8/29/05).
104
T.D. 9441, 74 Fed. Reg. 340 (1/5/09). The temporary regulations are set forth at Regs. §1.482-7T, and expire on Dec. 31,
2011. Regs. §1.482-7T(n). They are effective after Jan. 4, 2009.
The prior regulations, effective until Jan. 4, 2009, appear at Regs.
§1.482-7A.
105
See generally Benshalom, ‘‘Sourcing the ‘Unsourceable’:
The Cost Sharing Regulations and the Sourcing of Affiliated
Intangible-Related Transactions,’’ 26 Va. Tax Rev. 79 (2007).
106
Durst & Culbertson at 78–79 (footnotes omitted).

of the 1985–95 dispute. Durst and Culbertson note
that ‘‘the scope of political concern over transfer pricing enforcement in the United States’’ expanded ‘‘beyond its traditional focus on outbound migrations of
business activities from the United States to situations
involving the distribution of tangible products in the
United States,’’ particularly the low rate of observed
taxation of the profits of Japanese exporters of automobiles and electronic products to the United States.
They note that ‘‘[p]olitical concern with the allegedly
low levels of income of U.S. subsidiaries of foreign
companies became so substantial that legislators offered serious proposals for the imputation of minimum levels of taxable income for foreign-owned subsidiaries, in apparent contravention of international
tax norms,’’ and observe that the ‘‘transfer pricing issue even enjoyed a brief period of notoriety in the
general press as an issue in the 1992 U.S. presidential
campaign.’’ 107
1. Transfer Pricing and the 1992 Presidential
Campaign
The presence of the issue in the presidential campaign was not so brief. Transfer pricing first appeared
as an issue in the general press in a front page article
in the Sunday New York Times in February 1990.108
In the presidential campaign, Governor Clinton repeatedly claimed that he could raise $45 billion from
foreign companies in four years by strengthening
transfer pricing rules; shortly before the election, the
Times would characterize the proposal as ‘‘one of the
pillars of his plan to cut the Federal deficit,’’ and
‘‘central to his dispute with President Bush over
whether a Clinton Administration would have to raise
income taxes on middle-income voters.’’ 109 A Nexis
search of ‘‘Clinton and foreign companies and 45 billion’’ between May 1, 1992, and January 1, 1993, in
the ‘‘major newspapers’’ file yielded 54 results. Transfer pricing was a major issue in the campaign, and a
central promise of Governor Clinton.
2. Clinton Administration Abandonment of
Campaign Promises
What happened after the election? Very swiftly,
though not publicly, the incoming administration assured the business community that it intended no
‘‘fundamental change,’’ but rather reforms along the
lines already proposed by the Bush Administration.
That administration had been working with the OECD
and other Member States with respect to their objections to the 1992 proposed regulations, which had
convoluted provisions implementing ‘‘net income
benchmarking.’’ There had been widespread belief
that the Clinton proposals would have had to involve
some move toward formulary methods; the incoming
administration quickly quashed such an expectation.
107

Durst & Culbertson at 79 & n.161.
Pear, ‘‘I.R.S. Investigating Foreign Companies for Tax
Cheating,’’ New York Times (2/18/90) at p. 1.
109
Cushman, ‘‘Clinton Seeks Taxes on Hidden Profits,’’ New
York Times (10/23/92) at p. 9.
108
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With it, too, it abandoned any hope — the realism of
which even opponents of arm’s-length had doubted all
along — of raising anything close to $45 billion from
foreign companies from transfer pricing enforcement.
3. Interest Group Theory and Two Species of
Capitalism
i. ‘‘Parliamentary Parentheses’’
This pivot did not stand in isolation. The Clinton
Administration comprehensively embraced the ‘‘free
trade’’ policies espoused by the Republican administrations of the 1980s, even though the Clinton campaign had questioned those policies, and distanced itself from them. But the Clinton campaign embraced
these policies aggressively, even radically. And it did
this by implicitly assuming a false antinomy that an
understanding of the ‘‘transfer pricing wars’’ in general, and the White Paper in particular, does a great
deal to illumine.
The antinomy is, of course, free trade versus protectionism, and, so cast, the outcome was foreordained: All respectable economic theory validates the
virtues of free trade. The reductionism of the White
Paper, and still more the 1992 proposed regulations,
lent credence to subsuming the transfer pricing issue
under the antinomy, because the ‘‘net income benchmarking’’ approach, and the minimum tax proposals
to which it bore a strong relation, had a decidedly protectionist aspect.
But the true critique of arm’s-length did not, as I
have stressed here throughout, have that aspect. That
critique, and the proposals it generated, were not
based upon notions that foreign exporters were being
undertaxed and thereby gaining competitive advantages over domestic producers that should be neutralized. That may have been the case, and if it was, it
added to reasons to redesign or abandon arm’s-length,
but the critique of arm’s-length was an effort to
achieve fair and economically neutral taxation of
cross border enterprise, on the assumption that the
profits of such enterprises should be subject to income
taxation.
ii. Anglo-American and German-Japanese
Capitalism
Moreover, the tension between that critique (as distinguished from net income benchmarking) and the
position of foreign governments and foreign business
was real, but it was not reflective of a tension between
free trade and protectionism. That tension more resembled a different antinomy, one articulated in contemporaneous sociology literature, between two forms
of capitalism, one predominant in Anglo-American jurisdictions, the other in Central European jurisdictions
and in Japan.110 The former is more rule-based and
formal; more open, publicly; drew sharper distinction
110

The notion of two different forms of capitalism emerged
from research by British interest group theorists in the early
1980s, which found that ‘‘between an earlier age of estatist interest that waned during the course of the late eighteenth century and

between public institutions and private enterprise;
and, especially in America, was decentralized and
heavily dependent on local public institutions, and
smaller, localized private business. The latter form,
an era of ‘collective’ or interest group rivalry that arose toward the
end of the nineteenth century lay an interval of relative parliamentary insulation from the needs and pleas of the marketplace’’;
‘‘[t]his era was the zenith of Bagehot’s parliament and of his informed public opinion; to borrow a suggestive, if overdrawn image: the liberal parenthesis.’’ Maier, ‘‘ ‘Fictitious Bonds . . . of
Wealth and Law’: On the Theory and Practice of Interest Representation,’’ in Organizing Interests in Western Europe: Pluralism,
Corporatism, and the Transformation of Politics 27 (Suzanne
Berger ed., 1981). This concept of the ‘‘parliamentary parenthesis’’ conditioned these theorists, in the wake of the collapse of the
Soviet Union in the late 1980s, to suggest that ‘‘it is only because
that struggle [between capitalism and socialism] loomed for so
long that we have failed to see that, in most other respects, the
‘neo-American’ and ‘Rhenish’ models are not merely different,
but antagonistic.’’ Crouch & Marquand, Introduction to Ethics
and Markets: Co-operation and Competition within Capitalist
Economies 1 (Colin Crouch & David Marquand eds. 1993). And
these theorists attribute this difference to the length and strength
of the ‘‘parliamentary parenthesis’’ in various societies and nations, suggesting that:
the longer the interval, or the sharper the breach, between the destruction of ancient guild and Stãndestaat
institutions and the construction of typically ‘modern’
interest organizations, the more committed did the state
become to liberal modes of interest representation, and
the less likely to tolerate sharing political space; the less
likely were modern organizations to target their ambitions on participation of that kind; and the less likely
were neo-corporatist institutions to become established.
Crouch, ‘‘Sharing Public Space: States and Organized Interest
in Western Europe,’’ in States in History 177 (John A. Hall ed.
1986). For an application of this theory to certain phases of the
‘‘thrift crisis’’ of the 1980s, a precursor to our contemporary ‘‘financial crisis,’’ see Langbein, ‘‘The Thrift Crisis and the Constitution,’’ 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 159, 167–170 (1996). For one of
many instances in which the clash continues to inform a broad array of public policy choices that involve international cooperation (namely, the role of ‘‘leverage’’ capital requirements in
relation to ‘‘risk-weighted’’ capital requirements, a subject that
warrants extended treatment in itself), see Braithwaite, ‘‘U.S. Prepares to Push for Global Capital Rules,’’ Financial Times
(4/26/10), available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/28959166-508211df-bc86-00144feab49a.html (last visited Apr. 26, 2010):
The most important fault line runs between a bloc of
countries that includes the US, the UK and Switzerland
and one that includes Germany, France and Japan.
The first group is enthusiastically behind a substantial
increase in capital ratios coupled with a more conservative assessment of what counts as capital, tough liquidity rules and a new simple leverage ratio.
The second group is more attached to the pre-eminence
of the current risk-based approach and wants the leverage ratio to have a much less important role in governing banks’ balance sheets.
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called with some unease ‘‘rhenish capitalism,’’ was
based on principles, more than rules; functioned with
greater coordination between business and government, and some obscurity as to the distinction between the two; was much more tolerant of nonpublic
arrangements between business and governments; and
functioned through highly integrated, large, centralized national institutions.
Most particularly, the former form of capitalism entailed a broader area of ‘‘public space,’’ in which ‘‘the
range of issues over which general, universal decisions are made within a given political unit, particularly decisions which are seen by political actors to affect overall social order,’’ is ‘‘monopolized by specialized political institutions: legislature, executive, and
judiciary,’’ rather than dominated by organized private
interest groups.111
In a real sense, arm’s-length, despite the universal
obeisance paid it by all free market governments, is a
product of the ‘‘rhenish’’ way of doing business. It
was made even more so in 1991 by the institution of
‘‘Advance Pricing Agreements,’’ which, in violation
of existing law, were held confidential, and as to
which the law was amended to assure their confidentiality once a major publisher brought a lawsuit challenging the Service’s earlier position on confidentiality.112 The proposal of the critics of arm’s-length for
‘‘modified fractional apportionment,’’ by contrast, was
an effort to introduce a more rule-formal, open and
consistent set of rules, consistent with a determination
to impose tax on transnational corporate income — if
you will, a more ‘‘American’’ way of doing business.
4. Clinton Policy and the Retreat from AngloAmerican Capitalism
Moreover, the distinction between these two antinomies in some sense defines the larger path the Clinton
111
Crouch, ‘‘Sharing Public Space: States and Organized Interest in Western Europe,’’ in States in History 177, 179–81 (1986).
112
See BNA v. IRS, D.D.C., No. 96-CV376, 2/27/96. For an account of the confidentiality dispute, see Ring, ‘‘On the Frontiers
of Procedural Innovation: Advance Pricing Agreements and the
Struggle to Allocate Income from Cross-Border Transactions,’’ 21
Mich. J. Int’l L. 143, 186, 204–07 (2000). The Service’s initial position is described in Turro, ‘‘United States: IRS Official Says No
APA Disclosure, But Generic Information to Be Provided,’’ 4 Tax
Notes Int’l 709 (4/6/92) (quoting then IRS Associate Chief Counsel International, Robert E. Culbertson); Stratton, ‘‘Competing Interests Snag APA Program Guidance,’’ 70 Tax Notes 138, 139
(1996). The position was criticized (to the point of ridicule) by
Mogle, ‘‘Advance Pricing Agreements Under Revenue Procedure
91-22,’’ 45 Bull. for Int’l Fiscal Documentation 356, 359–60
(July/Aug. 1991); McIntyre, ‘‘The Case of Public Disclosure of
Advance Rulings on Transfer Pricing Methodologies,’’ 91 Tax
Notes Int’l 2–27 (1/9/91). During the course of the lawsuit, the
Service changed its position and announced an intention to disclose the APAs. Moses, ‘‘Judge Allows BNA to Propose Schedule
for IRS to Make APAs Publicly Available,’’ 28 BNA Daily Tax
Rpt. G-7 (2/11/99); ‘‘IRS-Treasury Letter Announcing Intention to
Settle BNA APA Lawsuit,’’ 7 Tax Mgmt. Transfer Pricing Rpt. 88
(1/27/99) (copy of letter sent to APA participants indicating the
Service’s intent to disclose APAs under I.R.C. 6110). Congress responded in 1999 by amending §6103(b) to protect the APAs from
disclosure.

Administration took toward the international
economy. The theory of free trade, it must be remembered, was developed at a time when the sovereigns
in question were not democratic republics, but mercantilist monarchies, when sovereignty had a highly
personal character. The theory, and practical demands
for trade, helped undermine and ultimately destroy the
monarchical form of government. The theory of free
trade still holds when evaluating government measures explicitly motivated by a policy of giving advantage to particular economic actors subject to a sovereign’s jurisdiction. But the efficiency properties of
free trade are always less clear when aimed at dismantling internal policies devised not for purposes of revenue grabbing or protecting favored constituencies,
but to promote the general welfare, such as ‘‘entitlement’’ programs, or the taxation of capital or corporate income.
In an acid coda played after the regulations and
Guidelines were in final form, the Treasury held a
‘‘conference’’ on formula apportionment in December
1996, slightly more than a month after President Clinton’s re-election. Then–Deputy Secretary Larry Summers played host to the hearings. The hearings were
held at the insistence of Senator Byron Dorgan of
North Dakota, a former Chair of the Multistate Tax
Commission, who long was the only member of Congress who took a serious interest in the allocation
question, and was a strong advocate of an international move to formula apportionment. Indeed, it was
widely rumored that holding the conference was a
price the Administration had to pay in order to avoid
Senator Dorgan’s placing a hold on Summers’s nomination as Deputy Secretary.
In his opening remarks, however, Summers went a
distance well beyond any that was justified in singing
the praises of arm’s-length and denigrating the subject
of the conference. He began (with perhaps uncharacteristic sarcasm) by ‘‘thank[ing] Senator Dorgan for
his leadership on this subject.’’ But he then immediately ‘‘stress[ed] at the outset, the full, unqualified,
support of the United States government for the international consensus that has developed on how to tax
the cross-border transactions of multinational corporations,’’ and assured his audience that ‘‘[t]he fact that
the Treasury Department is holding this conference
does not indicate in any way that our support for the
arm’s-length method is wavering.’’ He averred that
‘‘[t]he Clinton administration has made tremendous
progress in improving the efficiency and application
of the arm’s length standard,’’ celebrating that ‘‘[t]he
U.S. joined with tax administrators of the OECD
member countries in issuing a report that provided a
ringing endorsement of the arm’s length principle.’’
As for fractional apportionment, the Deputy Secretary
allowed that ‘‘it may be time to examine whether
more radical changes to our tax system are in order,’’
but said that ‘‘major new cooperative steps to tax multinational corporations’’ had ‘‘already occurred, as
shown by our trading partners’ unanimous endorsement of our new transfer pricing methodologies.’’ He
compared formula apportionment to ‘‘other radical reforms proposed to our tax system,’’ but concluded for-
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mula apportionment ‘‘is not a realistic alternative to
the arm’s-length standard.’’ 113
Much of the objection and popular resistance to the
kind of ‘‘globalization’’ policies sired by the Clinton
Administration have been motivated by that administration’s losing sight of, or abandoning, the distinction
between dismantling policies expressly aimed at protection, and dismantling policies that serve the general
welfare but at the expense of inconveniencing (or
even penalizing, or taxing) major economic actors. Indeed, radical and aggressive ‘‘rhenification’’ of U.S.
economic policy seems in the long run likely to be the
hallmark and signal achievement of the Clinton Administration, effected under the able, if now somewhat
discredited, tutelage of its last two Treasury Secretaries, Robert Rubin and Lawrence Summers. Quite visibly, the administration’s quick abandonment of its
campaign promises regarding transfer pricing were of
this character. And equally visibly, a precise understanding of the distinction between the first Bush Administration’s ‘‘net income benchmarking’’ approach,
and the true nature of the theoretical critique of arm’slength, illumines the inner character of the more comprehensive betrayal prefigured by that abandonment.

VII. THE FATE OF THE MID-1990s
REVISIONS
To sum up the situation by the mid-1990s: There
was substantial academic authority and empirical evidence that the prevailing approach to taxing TNCs
was incurably unworkable, although many active professionals in the field, knowing this, remained mute
about it. The incumbent administration in the U.S. had
come to power implicitly but publicly promising to
change this system, yet had quickly (though privately
and quietly) retreated from the position even before
assuming power. The government itself had published
studies and regulatory proposals that took account of
the opposition to the status quo, yet it refused to renounce fidelity to the prevailing ideology, and had
proposed alternatives that were corrupted by narrow
concerns for revenue and possibly for industrial protection as well.
The results were the revisions of the regulations
and the OECD Guidelines in the mid-1990s. Durst’s
question is how the revisions worked out in addressing the problems identified with the pre-existing regime.

A. Interpretive Differences
1. The Modified Regulations as Giving Primacy to
Profit Splits
Before detailing the (relatively easy) answers to
this question, it is worth noting differences concerning interpretations of the essential content of the revised regulations. Again, the differences can be defined as between my own interpretation, and interpre113

The speech is reproduced at 96 TNT 242-23 (12/13/96).

tations described (if not necessarily accepted) by
Durst and Culbertson. Although the matter requires
extended discussion, which I have set forth elsewhere,114 in my view, if the regulations are read carefully, and the requirements for comparability and
other limitations set forth with respect to the various
‘‘methods’’ allowed by the regulations are taken seriously, the regulations devolve into a regime where the
predominant method used will be the residual profit
split method, with profits split according to a singlefactor formula, the single factor being intangible development costs. Four key features of the regulations,
as promulgated in 1995, accomplish this. These are
certain examples of the rules governing comparability
and contractual terms;115 the rules governing locating
the ‘‘owner’’ of intangible property,116 especially as
elucidated by certain examples that won fame as the
‘‘cheese examples’’;117 and the rules governing the residual profit split method itself.118
Based upon this analysis, it was originally my view
that the promulgation of the mid-1990s revisions represented less a triumph of the status quo, and less a
defeat for the advocates of basic reform, than had usually been supposed. This is because the residual profit
split method, as most commentators observed and
agreed, was a quasi-fractional method, a kind of way
station between conventional arm’s-length and formula apportionment. It was not a very good fractional
method. There was (and is) little justification, theoretical or otherwise, for using ‘‘intangible development costs’’ as a single allocation formula. Moreover,
there is ambiguity aplenty, little of it resolved by the
regulations or Guidelines, as to what constitute such
costs. But its prominence in the regulations was more
than a minor nod in the direction of a wholly different approach from that taken historically.
2. The Modified Regulations as Giving Rise to
Endless Searches for Comparables
To reach these conclusions one had to read the
regulations in a particular way, although I believe it
was the right way to read them. But the regulations
were a mass of detail, and indeed to some extent contradiction; they listed numerous methods, overlaid by
an ambiguous and novel ‘‘best method’’ rule, and
gilded by novel directions for constructing ‘‘arm’slength ranges’’ with an ‘‘interquartile range.’’ This led,
in practice, to the widespread use of various methods,
with some emphasis on the resale price and comparable profits methods, always constructing ranges
from the use of numerous comparables and publicly
available information. Durst and Culbertson aptly describe the process:
114
Langbein, ‘‘Transfer Pricing and the Outsourcing Problem,’’
106 Tax Notes 1299 (3/14/05).
115
Regs. §1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(C) Exs. 3–6 (as amended).
116
Regs. §1.482-4(f)(3).
117
Regs. §1.482-4(f)(3)(iv) Exs. 2–4 (superseded). On the
‘‘fame’’ (or ‘‘notoriety’’) of the ‘‘cheese examples,’’ see Durst &
Culbertson, at 117–18 & n.283.
118
Regs. §1.482-6(c)(2)(ii)(B) (as amended).
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The interquartile range quickly became a fixture of U.S. transfer pricing practice. For
many companies, contemporaneous documentation for U.S. purposes has become a
matter of determining a ‘tested party’ — that
is, the entity within the group that conforms
most closely to the routine, limited-risk paradigm underlying CPM — and then performing a search for comparables from compilations of data reported to the SEC by publicly
traded companies. Typically, the search begins by identifying several hundred companies in a relatively broad Standard Industrial
Classification category into which the tested
party appears to fit. Then, typically following
a predetermined pattern, the person performing the search applies various ‘screens’ —
that is, eliminating companies with specifically identified R&D expenditures above a
certain level, companies with repeated losses,
and companies differing greatly in size from
the tested party — in order to narrow the list
of potential comparables.
The person performing the search then reads
the detailed descriptions of the companies on
the narrowed list that are contained in SEC
disclosure statements, and on the basis of this
reading applies subjective judgment to select
a final list of comparables. The Service and
private practitioners apply this method in a
large number of cases on an everyday basis;
the IRS APA Program has published detailed
training materials describing this approach,
and IRS personnel outside the APA Program
also apply it routinely.
In broad outline the approach used conforms
to that envisioned by the authors of the White
Paper, but in practice the situation is quite different. . . . [G]iven the small sample sizes that
could arise in the context of a comparabilitydriven CPM, the regulations identified the interquartile range as a method that can apply to
small samples.
. . . [W]e are not convinced that the statistical
approach makes sense when sample sizes are
very small. It is our experience that when a
handful of comparables is involved in the
analysis, meaningful distinctions can be
drawn that permit the taxpayer to be more
closely identified with some subset of the
comparables, and that resorting to the purely
mechanical computation of an interquartile
range in such circumstances is relatively
likely to produce implausible results. This follows from the fact that there is no theoretical

reason to view the range identified under this
method as conferring any degree of confidence that data within the range is or is not
normal.
Indeed, in our experience application of the
interquartile range to small samples often results in the creation of a range that is too wide
to be of practical use in resolving cases.
Sample sizes in fact tend to be small; while
relatively few studies in our experience narrow the comparables to a sample as small as
four, sample sizes of less than ten are common. As would be expected given the wide
ranges of results that even very similar businesses experience in practice, the resulting
ranges tend to be extremely wide, often ranging from low negative numbers (for example,
a net operating margin of −2%) to relatively
high positive numbers (for example, a net operating margin of 8.5%).
****
A less technical but nevertheless serious concern is that current practices relating to a
comparables search and the construction of an
interquartile range have affected the dynamics
of dispute resolution by giving an appearance
of scientific method to what is in fact a subjective analysis. This appearance of scientific
method can make it much harder to resolve
cases: As a psychological matter it is far
easier to compromise over differences of acknowledgedly subjective viewpoints than to
admit shortcomings in analyses that one is
compelled to present as objective.119
This passage does describe actual practice under
the revised regulations. A careful evaluation of comparables, and careful use of the string of comparability considerations/embedded intangibles/intangible
ownership/residual profit split is thrown overboard, at
the siren song of the pseudoscientific ‘‘interquartile
range’’ and the ‘‘arm’s-length range.’’ Methods such
as the CPM and resale price are revivified in the process. But the end result is entirely reminiscent of results described early and late under the 1968 regulations: a broad spread between the position of the taxpayer and that of the government; and disputes that
are resolved on what in the final analysis are openly
subjective bases. Durst and Culbertson add some additional problems under the revised regulations: that
supposed objectivity only makes disputes more difficult to resolve; that the detour through the apparently
scientific rules devours resources and limits the government’s capacity to audit substantial numbers of
119

Durst & Culbertson at 110–112 (footnotes omitted).
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taxpayers; that the entire exercise demoralizes the
government staff, and sometimes even the professionals who represent the taxpayers.120
I do concede that practice under the regulations
(during their first decade) conformed much more to
the picture Durst and Culbertson paint than to the one
I sketch of the true content of the regulations. Notwithstanding this, I think there is one powerful bit of
evidence that my reading is the correct one. This evidence is the regulatory changes the second Bush Administration proposed in 2003,121 promulgated as
temporary regulations in 2006,122 and made final in
2009.123 The proposals accompanied other changes
the Bush Administration made in the regulations, a
broad proposal for new rules governing allocations
with respect to ‘‘intercompany services’’;124 and a revision of the cost sharing rules.125 But the proposals
that revised the main body of the transfer pricing
regulations were aimed precisely at those features of
the regulations that I argued made those regulations,
read properly, a quasi-fractional regime: the comparability rules; the intangibles ownership rules (with the
cheese examples, which the Bush amendments removed); and the substantive rules governing the residual profit split. The effect of the changes was to
eliminate the formerly pre-eminent role played by
‘‘intangible development costs.’’ And their effect was
to weaken, if not destroy, the manner in which those
rules functioned to push the residual profit split to the
foreground as the ultimate method to be used in making allocations. At the same time, by rendering indefinite how the residual profit split should be accomplished when the method was used, the changes emulsified whatever clarity the presence of that method
had lent to the overall regulatory scheme. Thus, the
conservative administration ‘‘de-fractionalized’’ the
system adopted in the mid-1990s, and retreated further toward the ‘‘ante bellum’’ arm’s-length system.
However the regulations are read or administered,
there remains the question of evaluating what they
120

This plaint about the condition of professionals working on
transfer pricing matters appears to have a dual aspect, suggesting
at once that the condition is a reason to seek improvement in the
rules, and also that the professional community can play a significant role in effecting such an improvement. I tend to doubt both
propositions.
121
Treatment of Services Under Section 482; Allocation of Income and Deductions From Intangibles, 68 Fed. Reg. 53447
(9/10/03).
122
T.D. 9278, 71 Fed. Reg. 44466 (8/4/06).
123
T.D. 9476, 74 Fed. Reg. 38830 (8/4/09).
124
These were finalized by T.D. 9476 in 2009 as Regs.
§1.482-9.
125
The Treasury promulgated a notice of proposed rulemaking
to amend the cost-sharing rules on Aug. 29, 2005. 70 Fed. Reg.
51116. These rules, substantially amended, were promulgated as
temporary regulations on Jan. 5, 2009, as T.D. 9441, 74 Fed. Reg.
340. The temporary regulations are set forth at Regs. §1.482-7T,
and expire on Dec. 31, 2011. Regs. §1.482-7T(n). They are effective after Jan. 4, 2009. The prior regulations, effective until Jan. 4,
2009, appear at Regs. §1.482-7A.

have accomplished. By 2003, when Durst and Culberson wrote, there was already trouble. I have quoted
above where much of the trouble lay — in the acceptance of the invitation by the regulations to construct
‘‘interquartile ranges,’’ large amounts of compliance
cost was incurred without discernibly reducing, and
sometimes enhancing, the apparent subjectivity of the
results reached. But the theme of Durst and Culbertson’s article points to a more fundamental problem
with the regulations, when applied in the context of
legislative changes adopted in 1990.

B. Ex Ante Documentation and Ex
Post Standards as Described by
Durst-Culbertson
It should be noted that, after amending §936 in
1982, and adopting the §367 superroyalty in 1984 and
the §482 superroyalty in 1986, Congress never again,
during these ‘‘wars,’’ addressed the substantive issues
raised by transfer pricing. It did, however, enact in
1990 a severe transfer pricing penalty under §6662.
This gave rise to the need for companies to produce
‘‘contemporaneous documentation’’ supporting their
transfer prices. This led to what Durst and Culbertson,
in the most trenchant phrases of their piece, identify
as the ‘‘root of the dilemma’’ of an ‘‘incomplete paradigm shift’’: the ‘‘conflict between ex ante procedural
rules and ex post substantive rules.’’ By this they referred to the requirement that taxpayers defend in advance their position, while the regulations continued,
as they had in 1968, to grant broad leeway to administrators to select methods to test transactions or intercorporate arrangements after the fact.
And responsibility for this conflict Durst and Culbertson assign unambiguously, if inexplicitly, not to
Congress, but to the foreign defenders of arm’slength. They quote extensively from the OECD
Guidelines, in parts that have little or no parallel in
the U.S. regulations, showing those Guidelines
‘‘adopting with relish the approach of the 1968 U.S.
regulations,’’ which:
consist to an almost astonishing extent of (1)
lengthy enumerations of factors that must be
taken into account in performing a proper
functional analysis of the circumstances surrounding each set of controlled transactions,
and (2) stern warnings against any attempt to
infer generally applicable rules that might reduce the need for detailed factual inquiry in
each specific case. The overall image created
is that the notion that transfer pricing analysis
could be simplified in a manner that would
permit its large scale application is a demon
that must be warded off with repeated verbal
incantations.
[L]ists, or language requiring reference to
large volumes of facts, appear throughout the
Guidelines. Also, and in a variety of contexts,
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the Guidelines stress repeatedly that in no instance can generally applicable principles be
distilled and applied, but that transfer pricing
analysis is legitimate only if it is based in each
instance on exhaustive analysis of the facts
and circumstances.
****
[T]he Guidelines do not seem to entertain any
real illusion that in practice, either taxpayers
or revenue authorities can take into account
the enormous volume of factual items that
reasonably might be expected to affect market
prices even in relatively simple business situations. Instead, what the Guidelines seem to
envision — indeed, to advocate — is a return
to historical patterns in which transfer pricing examinations were relatively low-key affairs, and resolutions were negotiated effectively on a gestalt basis.126
As I have noted throughout, the regulations and
Guidelines were developed in tandem and appear to
track each other. But in this respect there is clear deviation between the two, as Durst and Culbertson ably
detail. This harkens back to a conflict I described in
my criticism of the political stance of the Clinton Administration toward transfer pricing and toward globalization generally. Here the difference between the
U.S. and OECD approaches reflects the difference in
types of capitalism described in the sociological literature of the early 1990s: between a ‘‘rhenish’’ species (‘‘examinations were relatively low-key affairs,
and resolutions were negotiated effectively on a gestalt basis’’) and a more rule-formal, predictable, determinant public and publicly acceptable basis.

VIII. EVALUATING THE REGULATIONS
A. The Avi-Yonah/Clausing/Durst
Catalogue of Problems
As to how the revised regime has functioned, there
is little to add to the diagnosis set forth by A-YCD.
The recent A-YCD article eschews repetition of the
details of the theoretical objections to arm’s-length,
although it relies heavily on the fact of those objections. The A-YCD article rather focuses upon a catalogue of the practical detriments of the use of arm’slength. I have little to add to either their list or their
description of the problems:

• Most fundamentally, the SA [separate accounting]
system ignores the fact that multinational groups
of companies arise precisely in order to avoid the

126

Durst & Culbertson at 106–108 (emphasis added).

inefficiencies that arise when unrelated companies
must transact with one another at arm’s-length;127

• [T]he

porosity of current transfer pricing rules
creates an artificial tax incentive to locate profits
in low-tax countries, both by locating real economic activities in such countries and by shifting
profits toward more lightly taxed locations;128

• [T]he

current system is absurdly complex. . . .
[which] observers have described . . . as ‘a cumbersome creation of stupefying complexity’ with
‘rules that lack coherence and often work at cross
purposes’;129

• [P]articularly given the high U.S. corporate statutory tax rates, the U.S. corporate tax system raises
relatively little revenue;130

• [I]t is important to note that the problems with the

current system derive not from rules at its periphery, but instead from a fallacy that lies at the system’s central core: namely, the belief that transactions among unrelated parties can be found that
are sufficiently comparable to transactions among
members of multinational groups that they can be
used as meaningful benchmarks for tax compliance and enforcement.131

They then describe the undesirable ‘‘results’’ of this
system:
• Companies and the government spend extraordinary sums each year on efforts at compliance and
enforcement;132

• Despite the expense of compliance and enforce-

ment, companies and the IRS typically are dramatically far apart in their determinations of
arm’s-length pricing;133

• The

inability to predict whether their positions
will be sustained leaves companies and their investors with large areas of uncertainty in their financial statements;134

• The

absence of clear standards for compliance,
coupled with the ability under the arm’s-length
standard to apportion income to low-tax countries
through legal arrangements governing the siting
of intangibles and (more recently) the bearing of

127

A-YCD at 501.
Id.
129
Id. at 502.
130
Id.
131
Id. at 503.
132
Id. at 504.
133
Id. at 505.
134
Id.
128
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risk, make it impossible for Congress to predict
with reasonable accuracy the actual amount of
federal revenue that will be raised as a result of
any particular corporate tax rate that Congress believes it has enacted;135

• [T]he

resolution of issues involving such large
amounts of money, without the benefit of clearly
discernable decision-making standards and public
scrutiny, is not healthy for the tax system;136

• A related problem is that the uncertain results under current transfer pricing law degrade the quality of tax practice on the parts of both taxpayer
and government representatives;137

• The resulting atmosphere contributes to a lessening of the publicly perceived credibility of both
corporations and the government — a development that is seriously damaging to . . . a largely
mixed economic system;138

• The vulnerability of the current transfer pricing

system to the shifting of income based on intangibles ownership and risk-bearing makes necessary numerous additional complexities in the international tax system;139

• The

current transfer pricing system . . . can be
seen as the tail that wags the dog of much unnecessary tax complexity.140

B. Observations on the Problems
1. Continuum Price Problems: Resurrection of
Problems of the Old Regime
Four points are in order.
First, this account suggests the revisions of the mid1990s accomplished virtually nothing and indeed
were counterproductive. The situation is what I described in 1986 as ‘‘continuum price derangement’’:
There is a long continuum of prices, encompassing often a substantial or majority percentage of gross revenue, along which any price is one that would bring
the two hypothetically ‘‘unrelated’’ parties to the
table.141 This generates the large area of controversy,
the commitment of undue amounts of resources to the
problem, the uncertainties for both business and government. I do not think it was foreordained, by the revised regulations as written. As I note above, those
regulations could have been read to move the system
135

Id.
Id. at 506.
137
Id.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id. at 507.
141
Langbein, Unitary Method, at 654–66. See also Notice 88123, 1988-2 C.B. 458 (White Paper).
136

toward a quasi-fractional one that was at least more
orderly and predictable than the system under the
1968 regulations. But this is not the course the governments and taxpayers took, egged on, no doubt, by
the stance of the OECD Guidelines against the use of
any a priori criteria, and by taxpayer representatives,
principally the large accounting firms, anxious to employ their large databases in connection with the spuriously objective notions that riddle the regulations
and Guidelines. That having been accomplished, there
is little reason to question the conclusions of A-YCD
that the current system is at least as ‘‘schizoid’’ — the
word I used in 1986 — and unworkable as that under
the 1968 regulations, quite possibly more so.
2. New Difficulties Under Revised Regulations
Second, however, there are sounds of new complaints that were not there, or at least not so pronounced, in the early and mid-1980s. These have a
triple aspect: the ‘‘degrad[ation of] the quality of tax
practice on the parts of both taxpayer and government
representative,’’ the ‘‘health’’ of the overall tax system; and the ‘‘credibility of both government and corporations’’ (not the tax system). One might add a
fourth point, although this was I think always implicit
in the whole debate about transfer pricing — that it
renders all other international tax discussion, whether
about specific issues (allocation of deductions to deferred income, for example) or overall policy (capital
export neutrality, ‘‘national’’ neutrality, national welfare versus worldwide welfare, ‘‘ownership’’ neutrality, ‘‘territoriality,’’ for that matter) either secondary
or unimportant, or outright evasive.
There is yet something more to be said about this
set of considerations. Not only did we not articulate
them in the late 1980s and early 1990s, but even as
late as 2007 — in the Hamilton Project paper by Professors Avi-Yonah and142Clausing — there is little if
They seem either to be the
any mention of them.
exclusive contribution of Michael Durst (which I believe unlikely) or mattered more to Professors AviYonah and Clausing (and other authors) in 2009 than
in 2007; I exclude the possibility that these concerns
arose, as an objective matter, in the two-year interval.
I believe it is fair to say that the presence of these
concerns — and they are present — is not purely attributable to arm’s-length itself as such, but draws a
lot from the history of the last 25 years. That is to say,
while the system may be deranged, and may have
been so all along, the fact that it was retained and furthered, and continues to be, in the face of widespread
recognition of its derangement, is an independent and
perhaps greater concern than the immediate consequences of the system itself.
3. The Difficulties and the Distinction Between
‘‘Anglo-American’’ and ‘‘Rhenish’’ Free
Enterprise
Third, much of the complaint registered sounds in
values of the old ‘‘American’’ system of capitalism, in
142

Clausing & Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in
a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’’ (Brookings Institution 2007). The document is available at
2007 TNT 114-38.
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its differentiation from the more ‘‘rhenish’’ variety.
Much emphasis is placed on predictability if not certainty — for businesses planning strategy, Congress
implementing fiscal policy, the public formulating its
views and its evaluation of Congress. Emphasis is
placed, too, on the integrity and the publicity of the
process, values not so much stressed on the continent.
4. The Avi-Yonah/Clausing/Durst Catalogue and
the Financial Crisis
Fourth, and possibly most serious, the A-YCD article was written — in contrast to the original Hamilton Project piece by Professors Avi-Yonah and Clausing — after the full onslaught of the 2007–08 financial crisis, and I think some of the concerns, which I
suggested above were much more clearly stated in
2009 than in 1986 or 1994, and even 2007, reflect the
public reaction to the crisis. This seems clearly true of
the concern for the credibility of both government and
corporations, a concern that presents itself in rather
novel form in the current environment. In the past,
politics has lined up with questions about the credibility of one or the other, with the ‘‘left’’ mistrusting
business, and the ‘‘right’’ mistrusting government; but
now there is widespread mistrust of both, and it tends
to be concentrated in what we generally think of as
the political ‘‘center.’’
It is true, too, of the concern for the ‘‘degradation’’
of practitioners. However it may be that, ‘‘[i]n the authors’ experience, those involved in this process have
served their roles with both integrity and skill,’’ 143 it
is nevertheless true, as I have suggested throughout,
that many of ‘‘those involved,’’ including one of the
authors, have kept their peace during the debates over
this process apparently much beyond the point at
which they reached conclusions at variance with the
views of the powerful interests in whose service they
were employed.
This final point suggests that lessons may be
learned from the transfer pricing episodes of the past
quarter century about larger, indeed general, questions
of the future of the currently unsettled international
economy.

IX. THE WORK OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMISSION TASK FORCE
This recognition of the continuing difficulties of the
arm’s-length system has been accompanied by a decided softening of views, mostly in Europe, of the viability of formula methods, as will be discussed. The
result has been two initiatives advocating adoption of
formula apportionment, one by the European Community, the other by the Brookings Institution’s Hamilton
Project in the United States.

A. Establishment of Task Force
In 2001, the European Commission (‘‘the Commission’’) broke with the idea of treating TNCs as a col143

A-YCD at 506.

lection of independent entities operating at arm’slength, and informed the European Council of its intention to introduce a Common Consolidated
Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), with formula apportionment, as a new way of taxing TNCs based in the
European Union (EU).144
In 2004, the Commission, with the approval of the
economics and finance ministers of the Member
States of the European Union, established a CCCTB
Working Group to evaluate the possibility of establishing a common European tax base.145 The European Commission is the body within the EU with authority to propose legislation and implement EU
policy, but it has no authority to enact tax legislation.
That power is exercised by the European Council of
Members (the ‘‘Council’’). The Council is composed
of sitting ministers of the Member States, but its actions require unanimity. Any Member State may exercise veto power over the action of the Council.146
The Commission has authority, however, to bring
litigation against Member States before the European
Court of Justice (ECJ), to enforce the ‘‘four freedoms’’ established under the EU treaty — the freedom
of movement of capital, the freedom of movement of
labor, the freedom to provide services, and the freedom of establishment. This litigation has resulted in a
long line of decisions, rendered principally with respect to the freedom of establishment, which have restricted the power of states to enforce such matters as
controlled foreign corporation provisions or thin capitalization rules.147 These decisions have generated
considerable controversy, and were part of the motivation to establish a CCCTB.

B. The European Commission and Tax
Harmonization
The Commission has a long and substantial history
of advocating tax harmonization, of rates and base,
144
Communication from the Commission to the Council, the
European Parliament and the Economic and Social Committee,
‘‘Towards an Internal Market Without Tax Obstacles: A Strategy
for Providing Companies with a Consolidated Corporate Tax Base
for Their EU-Wide Activities,’’ COM (2001) 582 final, available
at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=COM:
2001:0582:FIN:EN:PDF.
145
See Weiner, ‘‘Practical Aspects of Implementing Formulary
Apportionment in the European Union,’’ 8 Fla. Tax Rev. 629, 643
(2007).
146
For a description of the structure of the relevant European
Union institutions, see Warren & Graetz, ‘‘Income Tax Discrimination in the European Union,’’ 115 Yale L. J. 1186, 1188–89
(2007).
147
See, e.g., Cadbury Schweppes plc v. Commissioners of Inland Revenue, C-196/04, 2006 E.C.R. I-7995; Marks & Spencer
plc v. Halsey, C-446/03, 2005 E.C.R. I-10837; Manninen, C-319/
02, 2004 E.C.R. I-7477; Lankhorst-Hohorst GmbH v. Finanzamt
Steinfurt, C-324/00, 2002 E.C.R. I-11779. For a discussion of
these cases, see Warren & Graetz, ‘‘Income Tax Discrimination in
the European Union,’’ 115 Yale L. J. 1186, 1188–89 (2007); Dahlberg, Direct Taxation in Relation to the Freedom of Establishment
and the Free Movement of Capital (2005).
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within the European Community (EC), which was replaced by the EU under the 1992 Treaty of Maastricht. In 1961, the predecessor Commission established working groups to study harmonization, and established a Program for the Harmonization of Direct
Taxes. It continued to advocate harmonization for 30
years, until it became clear that harmonization was
not acceptable to all states, and thus not acceptable to
the Council.148
In 2004, the Commission expressed an intention
that the newly formed Working Group would unveil a
CCCTB proposal by the end of 2008. But by August
2008, Lazlo Kovacs, EU Tax Commissioner, announced a delay, declaring that he would rather
present ‘‘a perfectly elaborated and well justified
product at the appropriate time’’ than ‘‘an incomplete
one just to meet an artificial deadline,’’ although he
remained ‘‘fully committed to this project.’’ 149
Certain parameters of the CCCTB were established
in advance by the Commission. First, it was understood throughout that the CCCTB would be voluntary; companies would be permitted to continue using
their national tax systems. This condition was essential to securing business community support for and
participation in the project. Second, it was understood
that the formula apportionment system to be adopted
would stop at the EU’s ‘‘water’s edge,’’ that is, it
would allocate tax base among EU members, but
would not attempt to apportion the worldwide income
of EU entities between the EU and the rest of the
world.
The four years of study by the CCCTB Working
Group have been documented in public release of the
results of its meetings.150 The Working Group paid
careful attention to the U.S. states’ experience with
fractional apportionment. The lessons of the interstate
experience for the EU have generated a substantial
body of literature in the United States and Europe.151
148
See generally Warren & Graetz, ‘‘Income Tax Discrimination in the European Union,’’ 115 Yale L. J. 1186, 1227–29 & n.
143 (2007); Jimenez, Towards Corporate Tax Harmonization in
the European Community: An Institutional and Procedural Analysis (1999).
149
Kovacs, Eur. Comr. for Taxation & Customs Union, Keynote Speech at the Congress of the International Fiscal Association (8/31/08), available at http://ec. europa.eu/commission
barroso/kovacs/speeches/2008/0831IFA.pdf.
150
See, e.g., European Commission, Directorate-Gen. Taxation
& Customs Union, ‘‘Summary Record of the Meeting of the Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base Working Group,’’ CCCTB/
WP/055 (June 28, 2007), at 1, available at http://ec.europa.eu/
taxation customs/resources/ documents/taxation/company tax/
common tax base/CCCTBWP055 summary en.pdf (March 2007
meeting).
151
See, e.g., Hellerstein & McLure, Jr., ‘‘The European Commission’s Report on Company Income Taxation: What the EU
Can Learn from the Experience of the US States,’’ 11 Int’l Tax &
Pub. Fin. 199, 201 (2004); Hellerstein & McLure, Jr., ‘‘Lost in
Translation: Contextual Considerations in Evaluating the Relevance of US Experience for the European Commission’s Company Taxation Proposals,’’ 58 Bull. Int’l Fisc. Doc. 86 (2004);

C. Delay of Final Recommendations of
the Task Force
However, as the project deadline approached,
completion proved impossible, largely for the main
reason the OECD Guidelines and OECD spokespersons had advanced for rejecting formula apportionment in the mid-1990s: the impossibility of securing
international agreement, first on the use of formulary
methods, and second on identifying the appropriate
allocation criteria.152 As to the first, the project appears to have encountered resistance mainly from
countries with lower taxes and tax incentive programs
designed to attract capital investment by multinationals. As to the second, in its most recent deliberations,
the Working Group contemplates a cumbersome sixfactor formula, based on employees, payroll, tangible
assets, intangible assets, destination-based sales, and
origin-based sales.153
Nonetheless, the CCCTB project is a measure of a
goodly distance traveled since the inception of the attack by foreign governments and multinationals on
the state systems in the mid-1970s, and the ‘‘transfer
pricing wars’’ of the 1985–95 period. No other issue,
as Richard Vann once observed in the early 1990s,
generated the ‘‘heat’’ that transfer pricing did — but
by the time of the CCCTB project inception, John
Neighbour, an OECD official, reportedly observed
that some of the ‘‘political heat has gone out’’ and the
passage of seven years should enable parties to ‘‘look
a little more coldly’’ at pricing controversies.154 Professors Avi-Yonah and Clausing note, entirely accurately:
McLure, Jr. & Weiner, ‘‘Deciding Whether the European Union
Should Adopt Formula Apportionment of Company Income,’’ in
Taxing Capital Income in the European Union: Issues and Options for Reform 243 (Sijbren Cnossen ed., 2000); MartensWeiner, Company Tax Reform in the European Union: Guidance
from the United States and Canada on Implementing Formulary
Apportionment in the EU (2006).
152
See O’Shea, ‘‘Tax Harmonization vs. Tax Coordination in
Europe: Different Views,’’ 46 Tax Notes Int’l 811, 813 (5/21/07)
(‘‘[There is] no presumption that coordination will lead to Europewide action,’’ quoting Dawn Primarolo, U.K. Paymaster Gen.,
Statement Before the U.K. House of Commons European Standing
Committee
(3/6/07),
available
at
http://
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/cmgeneral/euro/
070306/70306s01.htm); Hey, ‘‘EU Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base: Guided Variety Versus Strict Uniformity —
Lessons from the U.S. States’ Tax Chaos’’ 2 (Jean Monnet Working Paper No. 02/08, 2008), available at http://
www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/08/080201.pdf; Kofler &
Mason, ‘‘Double Taxation: A European ‘Switch in Time’?’’ 14
Colum. J. Eur. L. 63 (2007); Weiner, ‘‘Cooperation in European
Tax Reform: Why Can’t We Be Friends?’’ 45 Tax Notes Int’l 939
(3/12/07).
153
Mintz & Weiner, ‘‘Some Open Negotiation Issues Involving
a Common Consolidated Tax Base in the European Union,’’ 62
Tax L. Rev. 81, 106–07 (2008).
154
Durst & Culbertson at 129 n.316, quoting ‘‘OECD to Conduct Peer Review of Mexico’s Transfer Pricing Policies, Rules,’’
10 Tax Mgmt. Transfer Pricing Rpt. 993 (4/17/02).

Tax Management International Journal

subsidiary of The Bureau of National Affairs, Inc.
姝 2010 Tax Management Inc., aISSN
0090-4600

595

ARTICLE
For anyone who has followed the formulary
debate for some time, the EU move toward
CCCTB is amazing. CCCTB could not move
forward without support from Germany,
which traditionally has been at the forefront
of opposition to any departure from the classic arm’s length standard and the traditional
transfer pricing methods. CCCTB also could
fail if the United Kingdom were opposed, and
the United Kingdom spearheaded the opposition to California’s use of world-wide formulary apportionment in the 1980’s and early
1990’s.155
Indeed, in a symposium apparently timed to coincide with the announcement of final action on the
CCCTB, the Tax Law Review featured an article, together with a number of comments, not on the merits
of arm’s-length versus fractional apportionment, but
rather on the application of game-theoretic approaches to the question of how to procure agreement
within the EU on the adoption of the CCCTB, with
fractional apportionment.156 Contemporaneous scholarship addressed what we might call ‘‘sub-legal’’
means of achieving coordination (‘‘soft law’’ and ‘‘cooperative’’ approaches) by a premier student of state
fractional methods.157
It is fine for nations to argue for their own fiscal interests, on their own terms, just as it is fine for taxpayers to minimize their taxes legally and to advance
public policy positions that favor mitigation of corporate taxation. And it is fine for academics and public
officials to invoke economic and legal theories of process in consideration of means of overcoming the tensions between principles of national sovereignty and
principles of sound fiscal and economic policy.
What is not fine is what happened during the 1980s
and 1990s in discussions over transfer pricing: government and business cooperatively sloganeering and
perpetuating falsehood, and silencing arguments they
were unable to refute, and obfuscating if not destroying meaningful public debate. Today, the debate over
the viability of arm’s-length is over, for all intents and
purposes, as Professors Avi-Yonah and Clausing
(among others) insist. Staunchly conservative com155

Avi-Yonah & Clausing, ‘‘Commentary,’’ 62 Tax L. Rev. 119,
123–24 (2008).
156
See Mintz & Weiner, ‘‘Some Open Negotiation Issues Involving a Common Consolidated Tax Base in the European
Union,’’ 62 Tax L. Rev. 81 (2008). The comments included AviYonah & Clausing, ‘‘More Open Issues Regarding the Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in the European Union,’’ 62 Tax L. Rev.
119 (2008); More, ‘‘What Does ‘Game Theory’ Tell Finance Ministers about Whether They Should Support a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base in the EU?’’ 62 Tax L. Rev. 125 (2008);
Utz, ‘‘The European CCCTB as the Outcome of a Virtual Game,’’
62 Tax L. Rev. 135 (2008).
157
McLure, Jr., ‘‘Legislative, Judicial, Soft Law, and Cooperative Approaches to Harmonizing Corporate Income,’’ 14
Colum. J. Eur. L. 377 (2008).

mentators in defense of arm’s-length make occasional,
vestigial arguments that retain some force: defending
cost sharing as implementing a ‘‘comparable arrangements’’ interpretation of arm’s-length;158 questioning
the viability of a sales factor under formula apportionment;159 or understanding that formula apportionment
has links to the policy tradition of ‘‘tax harmonization’’ that may be hard to break.160 But there is general agreement that arm’s-length is an anachronism,
either because of a change in the nature of international business, or because it served political purposes
and guarded against political dangers that are no
longer potent forces in the world economy.
Nevertheless, we face a wide array of challenges in
international tax specifically and international economic policy generally at the present time and for the
foreseeable future. These include development of an
international framework for regulating financial institutions; means for ensuring the stability of such institutions without conferring privileges that immunize
them from competition or legal sanction; means for
extricating central banks from fiscal decisionmaking
into which they have, sometimes on constitutionally
questionable grounds, inserted themselves; arguments
over government welfare and labor support programs;
and, perhaps above all, means to combat tax evasion
and to devise fiscal solutions to worldwide, deepening
difficulties of government indebtedness. These will
not be easy to solve, and they will entail concessions
by, even setbacks for, many parties, including many
powerful, private parties. The progress of theory and
policy in transfer pricing teaches us lessons that will
be valuable in these coming tasks, if they are properly
learned. One lesson is that powerful parties will often
resort to shouting down or silencing policy discussion
that threatens their interests, when such discussion
first emerges. Another is that the silence, equivocation, or outright dissembling of knowing professionals, often in the hire of the powerful, disserves the
public interest in serious, destructive ways.

X. PROPOSALS FOR UNILATERAL
ADOPTION OF FORMULA
APPORTIONMENT BY THE UNITED
STATES
A. Hamilton Project Paper
In June 2007, the Brookings Institution’s Hamilton
Project released a report — authored by Professors
Avi-Yonah and Clausing — recommending that the
158
E.g., Ackerman and Chorvat, ‘‘Modern Financial Theory
and Transfer Pricing,’’ 10 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 637 (2002).
159
Roin, ‘‘Can the Income Tax Be Saved? The Promise and
Pitfalls of Adopting Worldwide Formulary Apportionment,’’ 61
Tax L. Rev. 169 (2008).
160
Graetz & Warren, Jr., ‘‘Income Tax Discrimination and the
Political and Economic Integration of Europe,’’ 115 Yale L. J.
1186 (2006).
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U.S. unilaterally adopt formula apportionment based
on sales as a single factor.161 The Project involved, in
its own words, an effort ‘‘to advance America’s promise of opportunity, prosperity, and growth,’’ although
the reports it sponsored expressed the views of their
various authors, not of the Project or the Brookings
Institution itself. The Project expressed a willingness
‘‘to introduce new, sometimes controversial, policy
options into the national debate with the goal of improving our country’s economic policy.’’

in certain respects expanded form, in the Administration’s fiscal 2011 budget.165

C. Durst Presentation to May 2009
Meeting of the Canadian Branch of
the International Fiscal Association
But the interest shown by the proposals in international tax avoidance and evasion stirred considerable

B. Obama Budget Proposals
In February 2009, President Obama’s first budget
earmarked $210 billion to be derived from efforts to
‘‘implement international tax enforcement, reform deferral and other tax reform policies.’’ 162 On May 4,
2009, President Obama issued a White House fact
sheet detailing specifics of proposed international tax
reform.163 These included limitations on deductions
allocable to income earned through foreign subsidiaries, and thus qualifying for ‘‘deferral’’ from current
taxation; a proposal to require U.S. companies to determine their deemed paid foreign tax credits according to the average rate of total foreign tax actually
paid on total foreign earnings, eliminating the crosscrediting of high- and low-tax foreign income; certain
reforms of the ‘‘check-the-box’’ rules to prevent shifting of income to ‘‘tax haven’’ subsidiaries; a variety
of rules for ‘‘cracking down’’ on abuse of tax havens
by individuals; and devoting new resources for IRS
enforcement to ‘‘help close the international tax gap.’’
The Obama proposals made no mention of transfer
pricing. And the Administration has been equivocal in
expressing continuing support for the proposals. At
one point, press reported that the Administration had
assured industry leaders that the proposals had been
motivated only by revenue needs, and that the Administration would not seriously pursue them 164 — but
the proposals nevertheless reappeared, in modified but

Lurking behind the tax debate was the administration’s
need for new sources of revenue to fund its increased
spending. [Lawrence Summers protégé, and former
Hamilton Project Chair] Jason Furman, a White House
economic adviser, made that point clear at the end of a
session with a dozen or so lobbyists in March. Catherine Schultz, head of tax policy at the National Foreign
Trade Council, who was at the meeting, says Mr. Furman basically told the group:
‘‘We need the money.’’
****
When Ms. Jarrett and Mr. Summers met in midSeptember with a half-dozen top executives, including
Boeing Co. Chairman James McNerney Jr., deferral
again dominated the conversation. But the tone was cooperative, Ms Jarrett says. ‘‘We actually put the burden
back on them — if they don’t like the deferral, to think
of other revenue generators,’’ she says. ‘‘We have to do
something about the deficit, so I am very curious to see
what response we get back.’’
One foe of the plan, Rep. Richard Neal, a key Democrat
on the Ways and Means Committee, says, ‘‘We’ve made
real headway.’’ He says he urged Mr. Obama personally
at a White House meeting to shelve the idea until a
larger tax-overhaul discussion next year. ‘‘I don’t think
this will haunt the rest of the fall,’’ he says.
Businesses haven’t dropped their guard, however.

161

Clausing & Avi-Yonah, ‘‘Reforming Corporate Taxation in
a Global Economy: A Proposal to Adopt Formulary Apportionment’’ (Brookings Institution 2007). The document is available at
2007 TNT 114-38.
162
See 2009 TNT 37-1 (2/26/09).
163
The release, ‘‘Leveling the Playing Field: Curbing Tax Havens and Removing Tax Incentives for Shifting Jobs Overseas,’’
appears at 2009 TNT 84-44 (5/4/09).
164
King Jr. and Williamson, ‘‘Business Fends Off Tax Hit —
Obama Administration Shelves Plan to Change How U.S. Treats
Overseas Profits,’’ The Wall Street Journal (10/13/09) at p. A1:
The story of the business community’s campaign
against the tax changes and the Obama administration’s
eventual retreat offers a window into the often uneasy
relations between the White House and the corporate
world. It suggests that an administration that was critical of business at the height of the financial crisis is becoming more accommodating. The White House,
through a series of presidential lunches and other outreach, is trying to soothe tensions with multinational
companies.

The full story in the Journal is in fact less convincing about
any real ‘‘assurances’’ given by the Administration than the headline suggests; the whole story exhibits some tenacity and commitment on the part of the Administration. Also, Rep. Neal’s opposition to the plan has to be understood in the context of his announced intention to study transfer pricing generally in the Ways
and Means Subcomittee that he chairs.
165
The 2011 proposals limited the deduction disallowances to
interest expense, and would not apply the disallowance to sales
and general and administrative expenses. The fiscal 2011 budget
included a new proposal to tax excess returns (30% or greater)
from offshore transfers of intangibles to related controlled foreign
corporations that are subject to a low tax rate (10%) by treating
the amount of the excess return as subpart F income. This is a
transfer pricing–type concept, and some have criticized it as a
‘‘shocking’’ entry into a ‘‘formula-type approach,’’ but the Administration has said it would be confined to situations of ‘‘excess’’
profit shifts and would not affect transfer price determinations.
See 2010 TNT 37-3 (remarks of Barbara Angus, partner, international tax services, Ernst & Young, response of Manal Corwin, international tax counsel).
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interest among advocates of reform. There was considerable discussion of the proposals, with expressions of support from tax reform advocates,166 and
opposition from business and other conservative
circles.167 Of special note was the speech delivered to
a meeting of the Canadian Branch of the International
Fiscal Association (IFA) May 21, 2009, by Michael
Durst, titled, ‘‘The President’s International Reform
Proposals in Historical and Economic Perspective.’’
Notwithstanding the absence of any direct reference
in the President’s proposals to transfer pricing, Durst
began by relating an abbreviated statement of his version of the history of the present rules. This embodied, in hardened form, some of the matters with which
I have taken issue above — notably the claim that in
the early days of multinational form, the corporations
‘‘could not function as true multinationals with centralized management,’’ and established ‘‘[p]ricing
among the members of these pre-war groups almost
certainly resembled pricing between independent
companies acting at arm’s-length, if only because existing technology didn’t permit any other approach’’;
and the equation of the critique of arm’s-length during the period of the ‘‘great transfer pricing wars’’
with U.S. ‘‘minimum tax’’ objectives.168
But then Durst, an early head of the IRS’s APA office and officially a long-time supporter of arm’slength, surprised his audience with a change of view:
Now, before addressing the Obama Administration’s proposals, and again because of the
nature of this particular audience, I should acknowledge that throughout the last 40 or so
years, debate has continued among seriousminded people over whether the arm’s-length
system can, feasibly, be replaced, or whether
it is instead the best of available evils. I
plainly have formed my own views on this
topic; I think that a more formulary approach,
while subject to many difficulties, is not only
feasible but would be much less problematic
in administration than the current approach.
Speaking here in Toronto, I should say that I
am especially puzzled by the argument sometimes raised that moving away from arm’s
length, without raising undue double taxation
conflicts, would require international agreement on a single formula, perhaps at a grand
global Congress of Vienna — or, remembering the role of the League of Nations in our
story, maybe a Versailles Conference — on
166

See, e.g., 2009 TNT 84-47 (‘‘CBPP Calls Obama’s International Tax Proposal a ‘Step Forward’ ’’).
167
See, e.g., 2009 TNT 87-41 (‘‘Heritage Says Obama International Tax Proposal Would Harm U.S. Competitiveness’’)
(5/5/09); 2009 TNT 84-45 (‘‘Business Roundtable Says Obama International Tax Law Plan Will ‘Cripple’ U.S. Growth’’) (5/4/09).
168
Durst Presentation, 123 Tax Notes at 1269, 1271.

international taxation. One needs only to look
at the state of competent authority proceedings today, not only between the United States
and Canada but around the world, to determine how well the arm’s-length standard has
fared in managing international disagreement,
including double taxation. Under a formulary
system, even if different countries used different formulas, there would at least be clear
starting points for negotiation and compromise.169
Durst also reiterated what he and Culbertson had
suggested six years earlier, with some reference to the
work of the European Commission, about the softening of positions about fractional apportionment:
Also, before moving on to the President’s recent proposals, I should observe as background that the political positions of non-U.S.
governments with respect to the arm’s-length
standard have, I think, changed at least somewhat since the mid-1990s. Today, not only
companies in the high-tech areas, but also traditional brick-and-mortar companies, have
learned the technique, through ‘‘restructuring,’’ of using the principles of the arm’slength standard to direct portions of their incomes to low-tax jurisdictions. Therefore, tax
administrations that felt themselves immune
to such techniques 15 years ago do not view
themselves as immune today.
If the issue of formulary versus arm’s length
were to come up again, it is not clear that
governments around the world would be as
adamant in supporting the traditional ‘‘facts
and circumstances’’ approach as they were
during the early 1990s. The continued — albeit sometimes faltering — consideration
within the European Union of the Common
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base proposal attests, I think, at least to some fluidity of views
on this question.170

D. Avi-Yonah/Clausing/Durst
Defense of Fractional
Apportionment
In 2009, Durst joined Professors Avi-Yonah and
Clausing in publishing an article setting forth and defending a statutory proposal for a formula apportionment system using sales as a single apportionment
169
170

Durst Presentation, 123 Tax Notes at 1272.
Durst Presentation, 123 Tax Notes at 1272.
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factor.171 The article largely restated the views expressed in the 2007 Hamilton Project paper.
In addressing the ‘‘downsides of formulary apportionment,’’ A-YCD identify five:
• The question whether formula apportionment is
‘‘inherently arbitrary’’;

• ‘‘[I]mplementation

issues associated with the
definition of activities and the determination of
the location of sales’’;

• ‘‘[P]roblems associated with interactions between
countries with incongruent corporate tax systems’’;

• Nonuniformity

of accounting standards across
countries, and the possible need for treaty modification; and

• The fact that ‘‘some domestic industries and firms
will find that their tax obligations will increase
under the new system.’’172

A-YCD argue that formula apportionment is no
more arbitrary than arm’s-length, given the possibilities arm’s-length opens for shifting profits to low-tax
‘‘base countries,’’ which they say is ‘‘a result . . . more
arbitrary than consistently assigning profits to the
market jurisdiction.’’ 173 They then concede that ‘‘any
formula can produce arbitrary results in a given industry,’’ but say that ‘‘while some industries will lose under the proposed formula, others (such as major U.S.
exporters) will win, and most taxpayers would gain
from the increased simplicity and transparency of the
FA regime,’’ and then argue that ‘‘[i]f companies are
willing to pay one level of tax and are only concerned
about double taxation, they should be willing to accept the FA option, which prevents double taxation
but also double non-taxation.’’ 174
With regard to implementation, A-YCD focus on
technical aspects of the single-factor system. A-YCD
set forth a proposed statute that addresses in detail a
number of subsidiary issues connected with their particular proposal, which involves, as does the residual
profit split method of the present regulations, assigning returns to ‘‘routine’’ factors prior to apportioning
residual profit, which under the A-YCD proposal is
based exclusively on sales.
As to interactions between countries, A-YCD concede that it ‘‘would be ideal for most major countries
to coordinate implementation of FA and to come to a
joint agreement on the definition of the formula for
apportioning global income,’’ but assert that ‘‘[e]ven
without formal cooperation, however, unilateral adoption by the United States of a reformed system for
taxing international income would create a powerful

incentive for other countries using separate accounting to adopt similar new systems.’’175 They set forth
two arguments for this view.
First, they argue that in a ‘‘world with both formulary and separate accounting system countries, formulary countries will immediately appear as tax havens
from a separate accounting country perspective,’’ because ‘‘a multinational firm operating in both separate
accounting and formulary countries would have an incentive to book all their income in formulary countries, as the tax liability in such countries does not depend on the income booked there, but rather the fraction of a firm’s activities in that location.’’ 176
This argument may be clarified by an example.
Suppose you have a two-country corporation with an
integrated profit of 120, of which 100 is ‘‘residual’’
profit. One country is a formulary nation with a
single-factor sales system, and in that country 60% of
sales occur. Assume the ‘‘routine’’ profits are 10 in
each country. The formulary country will inflexibly
tax 70 of the profit regardless of what the other country does. This gives the company an incentive to report the entire 100 residual to the formulary country,
leaving the arm’s-length state to challenge its allocation of a profit of 10 to that country. This, of course,
gives the company an opportunity to shelter 40 of
profit without using a base country. So it gives the
unilateral-formulary country leverage to pressure the
other country to go along with its system.
Second, A-YCD argue that the U.S. has ‘‘led the
way’’ in international tax in the past, citing the foreign
tax credit, the CFC provisions, and the transfer pricing regulations, and argue that ‘‘[i]t is quite possible
that if the U.S. adopted the proposed formulary split,
this would be another innovation that is widely copied, with or without explicit coordination.’’ 177 In the
end, however, A-YCD are forced to concede that if
‘‘other countries do not follow suit (or follow suit
much later), or if countries adopt different formulas,
there is the potential for double or zero taxation,’’ and
that this is ‘‘arguably, the largest obstacle to unilateral
adoption of a formulary system.’’ 178 Still, they say
the significance of the obstacle ‘‘should not be overstated,’’ again emphasizing a comparison to the current regime. They argue finally that the political disputes likely to arise are apt to be most intense with respect to low-tax countries, not other high-tax
countries, and that low-tax countries ‘‘may find themselves in political alliance with multinational companies themselves.’’ 179 They say that ‘‘[h]ow to resolve
the resulting controversy is a question that will need
to be resolved by Congress — but the controversy
175

171

A-YCD.
172
A-YCD at 516–25.
173
A-YCD at 516.
174
A-YCD at 519.

Id.
Id.
177
Id. at 520.
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Id.
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Id. at 521.
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should be recognized as primarily political in nature.’’ 180
With respect to nonuniformity and the definition of
the tax base, A-YCD express the view that the system
would work best with an internationally harmonized
tax base — which they distinguish from harmonized
rates, which they say parenthetically and without discussion would be ‘‘unlikely as well as undesirable.’’ 181 They note the movement in the U.S. toward
the adoption of international accounting standards,
suggesting that these standards could form the basis
of a ‘‘harmonized base,’’ but then say that, in any
event, if coordination could not be achieved, unilateral use of the U.S. definition of taxable income
would provide a workable basis for the system. They
also add recognition of concern about requiring ‘‘the
IRS to gain access to information on both U.S. and
foreign multinational groups’ operations outside the
United States,’’ which they dismiss by arguing that
‘‘[c]urrent transfer pricing law, however, already requires access to such information, both in the application of the profit split method and in the course of examinations.’’ 182
In relation to tax treaties, A-YCD argue that while
there is ‘‘no question that historically, both Article 7
and Article 9 have been interpreted as incorporating
‘arm’s-length’ concepts,’’ 183 there is no reason ‘‘why
the United States and its treaty partners could not
agree, under the ‘competent authority’ process . . . to
interpret their treaties to accept the reformed apportionment approach as the closest feasible, and administrable, approximation to the ‘arm’s-length’ results
envisioned in Articles 9 and 7.’’ 184 They argue that
‘‘[e]xcept for low-tax, ‘tax haven’ countries, one
would expect many if not most U.S. tax treaty partners eagerly to accept such an approach, since these
treaty partners face the same difficulties in enforcement and administration of transfer pricing rules that
the United States faces.’’ 185 They reiterate that
‘‘[p]olitical opposition to the reform from low-tax
countries and from businesses that will pay relatively
larger shares of the corporate tax burden must be respected and dealt with,’’ but say ‘‘such political opposition should be recognized for what it is.’’ 186
A-YCD cite studies showing that fractional apportionment would have disproportionate effects on different industries, raising taxes on oil companies, and
lowering them, for instance, on firms relying more on
export than direct foreign investment with regard to
their international operations. A-YCD respond by arguing that negative impacts ‘‘may be muted,’’ because
‘‘firms will benefit from reductions in complexity and
compliance burdens,’’ and ‘‘accompanying the adop180
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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Id.
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at 521–22.
at 522.
at 523.
at 524.

tion of a more formulary system with a reduction in
the corporate income tax rate would increase the number of firms benefiting from the adoption.’’ 187

XI. DIFFICULTIES WITH UNILATERAL
ADOPTION AND THE SINGLE
FACTOR SALES METHOD
A. The Single Factor Sales Method
1. Internalization Theory and the Choice of
Factors
Two aspects of this proposal generate controversy
among critics of arm’s-length and supporters of fractional apportionment: the use of sales as a single factor, and the proposal for unilateral action. Fractional
apportionment supporters who responded to the proposal tended to fuse the two,188 but they should be
separated, because they present some wholly separate
issues. Moreover, this proposal is heavily influenced
by the historical interpretation, especially of the history of the last 25 years, reflected in the DurstCulbertson article and the Durst IFA presentation. The
defects of the proposal may be linked directly to the
deficiencies of that interpretation.
As to the use of sales as a single factor, the principal justification for it lies, I believe, in the developments I sketched above as pre-dating the fights over
transfer pricing that began in the mid-1980s — specifically, the recognition that the conceptual underpinning of international tax policy was not capital export
neutrality, but a ‘‘classification and assignment’’ system that essentially assigns primary taxing rights to
the state from which the income in question is least
likely to move in response to taxation. The principal
justification for using a sales factor is that multinational corporations have assets, labor pools, and other
income-producing factors that can be relocated in response to tax changes, but have markets that are
largely fixed. On these assumptions, using sales as a
single factor best assures tax ‘‘neutrality,’’ that pre-tax
arrangements will remain unaffected by the imposition of tax.
2. Consequences of Ignoring the Distinction
Between Internalization-Based Critique of
Arm’s-Length and ‘‘Net Income Benchmarking’’
That being said, there are many questions about using sales as a single factor, and these are related to the
criticisms I set forth above, particularly about the
Durst-Culbertson interpretation of the ‘‘wars.’’ The
principal problem I identified with their interpretation
was their elision of the period between the White Paper and the issuance of proposed regulations, and, related to that elision, their identification of the critique
187

Id. at 526.
See Weiner, ‘‘Redirecting the Debate on Formula Apportionment,’’ Tax Notes (6/18/07) at p. 1164.
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of arm’s-length with the notion they describe as ‘‘net
income benchmarking.’’ In that interim period, we
critics of arm’s-length inquired into the nature of the
‘‘economies of integration’’ that give rise to multinational (integrated) form; and in doing so found justification for using both productive inputs (assets) and
indices of destination (sales) as a basis for allocating
integrated profit. By overlooking this element of the
critique, and not recognizing distinctions between the
genuine critique and ‘‘net income benchmarking,’’
A-YCD overlook considerations countervailing or
limiting the idea of making allocations exclusively on
the basis of the indices that are least easily changed.
Similar considerations apply to A-YCD’s insistence
that intangible assets be excluded from the calculation, as they are under most state systems. A-YCD assert that the value of the intangibles inheres in the entire organization, and therefore should be allocated according to otherwise applicable factors.189 I have long
insisted, in a related way, that it is incorrect to assume
that the ‘‘residual’’ income of multinationals is always
attributable to some identified set of rights that can
meaningfully be called ‘‘intangible property,’’ or
‘‘property’’ at all; often there is no identifiable intangible, and the residual is really attributable in full to
the ‘‘fact of organization,’’ in a sense taken from Alfred Marshall.190 But this is not the same as A-YCD’s
argument; their argument rather assumes the converse
of what I claim, that is, they seem to be saying it
never makes sense to attribute the residual to a localizable ‘‘intangible’’; I merely state that it does not always make sense so to attribute it. It seems to me not
only that ‘‘assets’’ should be used in any formula, in
some proportion, but that assets should include specifiable, localizable intangible assets, if such are present
and can be identified. And intangible assets can be reflected by ‘‘intangible development costs,’’ conceived
as they were under the 1994 regulations before the
2006–09 amendments. I do not believe any final judgments on this point should be made, in any event, until more is known how the intangible development
cost-based residual profit split method actually
worked in the 1994–2006 period.
3. Problems with Trade Agreements
But the use of the single factor sales method suffers
from more serious defects, and these have a direct relationship to the error of associating opposition to
arm’s-length with support of ‘‘net income benchmarking.’’ And these defects are considerably more serious
when the method, which rewards importer nations
with additional claims to revenue, is suggested as a
unilateral action for the U.S., a net importer for the
past 50-plus years. Thus, it sounds of the same theory
that underlies ‘‘net income benchmarking’’ (and that
grows out of the recognition of a ‘‘motility’’-based
system of assigning taxing rights): they are our markets; we have a right to tax the income generated in
189

A-YCD at 540.
Langbein, ‘‘Transaction Cost, Production Cost, and Tax
Transfer Pricing,’’ Tax Notes (9/18/89) at p. 1391, 1411.
190

them. For this reason, the unilateral adoption of that
method might stir reactions more like those stirred by
‘‘net income benchmarking’’ than those A-YCD wistfully forecast. In the example given above, for instance, the separate accounting state might anticipate
deliberate underreporting by multinationals operating
in (and overreporting to) fractional apportionment
states, and, instead of falling in line by adopting fractional methods it thinks disfavors itself, might begin
aggressive, even assembly-line audits and adjustments
of multinationals.
4. Problems with September 2009 G-20 Accords
and Reduction of U.S. Dependence on Imports
For that matter, as A-YCD in part recognize, the
single factor sales method might violate international
agreements other (and in some sense more important)
than income tax conventions. Fractional apportionment is often said to be little more than an excise tax
on the factors used to make the apportionment. Under
this theory, the tax on the income allocated under the
single factor sales method begins to look like a tariff,
which might violate General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade or World Trade Organization rules. Since publication of the A-YCD article, the Group of 20 nations
agreed informally to address global economic imbalances: that the United States would seek to enhance
its savings rate and reduce its trade deficit; China, Japan, Germany, and other export-driven economies
would attempt to increase domestic consumption and
reduce their trade surpluses.191 Unilateral adoption of
the single factor sales method would reward the
United States for its trade deficit with additional base
upon which to impose corporate income tax; at a
minimum, this is not consistent with the Group of 20
accord reached in Pittsburgh in September 2009.

B. Unilateral Adoption
As to the question of unilateral action, the A-YCD
proposal is quite suspect, and its lurking problems relate to several of the inaccuracies of the historical account to which the proposal is linked. These include
the false, undocumented proposition that ‘‘in the beginning’’ multinationals operated like a collection of
separate enterprises, and ceased to do so only when
communication and transportation facilitated centralization of management — an apparent fabrication
spelled out at extended length in Durst’s IFA presentation.192 It includes the emphasis throughout the
Durst-Culbertson article on interpreting historical
events as fights over revenue concerns, when in fact
an examination of the conflicts strongly suggests that
other concerns — especially disclosure, ‘‘transparency,’’ and the overall relationship of business and
government — are at the root of the acrimony. And, a
related point but perhaps the most important one, it
includes the minimization of the general political sig191
Andrews, ‘‘Leaders of G-20 Vow to Reshape Global
Economy,’’ New York Times (9/26/09) at p. 1.
192
See Durst Presentation, 123 Tax Notes at 1269.
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nificance the issue assumed in the 1990s, and the relationship of the Clinton Administration’s abandonment of transfer pricing reform to its overall approach
to shaping the international economy in the wake of
the collapse of the Soviet economy.
1. Unilateral Adoption and the Role of Transfer
Pricing in the Definition of ‘‘Borders’’ of Public
and Private Authority
When all of those matters are taken into account,
most elements of A-YCD’s defense of unilateralism
seem born of a childlike naivetë. Begin with their argument, spelled out at numerous points, that the political conflict would likely be not with high-tax countries, which had revenue concerns similar to ours, but
only with low-tax countries, allied with affected companies. This argument flows directly from understanding the history of this matter as primarily an issue of
revenue. But that understanding is flawed; there appears to be much more at stake, touching the basic relationship, and distribution of powers, between governments internationally and their powerful private
sector counterparts. When these latter matters are
taken into account, what can be expected of the governments of foreign, high-tax countries stands in a
starkly different light. This influences the forecasts
these authors make concerning the question of the
treaty compliance of their suggested method, the
problem of double taxation and the response of
separate-accounting countries to the unilateral fractional method, and the likelihood of developing a uniform international base.
2. Unilateral Adoption and the Problems of
Transparency and Information Gathering
These considerations also destroy, I think, their response to the question of concerns about international
information gathering. It is true that under the current
transfer pricing regimes, under some methods, reporting of worldwide financial information is required.
But the taxpayer may avoid this by defending methods that do not require it, and one suspects that the
relative disuse of the profit split method, in the face
of what a careful reading of at least the regulations as
in effect from 1994 to 2006 would suggest, bears
some relationship to taxpayer efforts to avoid the necessity of disclosing worldwide information. Taxpayer
reaction, and the reaction of foreign governments responsive to the concerns of their large corporate citizens, is likely to be quite different in response to a
system that requires, in all cases, worldwide information reporting.
3. The Role of Compliance Cost and Professional
Intermediaries as ‘‘Interest Groups’’
And a clear understanding of the history of transfer
pricing, particularly the ‘‘wars,’’ similarly demolishes
A-YCD’s hope that taxpayers acting as interest groups
will restrain opposition to the proposal on account of
reduced complexity and compliance costs. Complexity and compliance costs have attended the system for
40 years, without sparking substantial taxpayer complaint. Indeed, in my original article on this subject,

one of my paramount concerns with the ambiguity of
the system was the possibility of oppressive use of the
rules by the government against private enterprise, a
concern then suggested by the Marc Rich prosecution.193 That concern never generated any business
support, in part, possibly, because the business community recognized that the ambiguity and pliability of
the rules — and the quondam susceptibility of instrumentalities of government — could also be used as
weapons in severe business competition and battles.
In large corporate and financial matters, business
and the intermediaries who impose the compliance
costs (investment bankers, lawyers, accountants) often
are aligned politically even where they are on the opposite side of the table, considering the professional
fees that constitute the lion’s share of the costs. This
pattern can be seen with respect to the Service’s campaign against tax shelters in the recent decade. The
IRS has prevailed in litigation generally with respect
both to shelters marketed primarily to individuals 194
and to those marketed to corporations.195 In the
former cases, the banks, law firms, and accounting
193

Langbein, Unitary Method, at 666:

Finally, while I do not want to overemphasize the point,
and while I again stress I am not accusing anyone of
anything, a schizoid regime like ‘‘arm’s length’’ makes
the imposition of an unjust (civil or criminal) penalty ultimately on someone somewhere inevitable.
194
E.g., Klamath Strategic Investment Fund, LLC v. U.S., 568
F.3d 537 (5th Cir. 2009); Kornman & Associates Inc. v. U.S., 527
F.3d 443 (5th Cir. 2008); Cemco Investors LLC v. U.S., 515 F.3d
749. These decisions have involved ‘‘son of BOSS’’ structures described and attacked by the Service in Notice 2000-44, 2000-2
C.B. 625, which appears to be the principal form of shelter designed for individuals which the Service extensively and vigorously litigated. There are numerous district court decisions upholding the IRS’s position. The Service lost one ‘‘son of BOSS’’
case in the district courts, Sala v. U.S., 552 F. Supp. 2d 1167 (D.
Colo. 2008), a case exhibiting special circumstances, but won it
on appeal. No. 08-1333, 10th Cir. 7/23/10.
195
See, e.g., BB&T Corp. v. U.S., 523 F.3d 461 (4th Cir. 2008)
(‘‘lease-in/lease-out’’ (LILO) transaction); TIFD III-E, Inc. v. U.S.,
459 F.3d 220 (2d Cir. 2006) (‘‘Castle Harbor’’); Coltec Indus.,
Inc. v. U.S., 454 F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (‘‘contingent liability’’ shelter); Black & Decker Corp. v. U.S., 436 F.3d 421 (4th Cir.
2006) (‘‘contingent liability’’ shelter). The Service won early victories in litigation against the so-called ‘‘contingent installment
sale shelter,’’ promoted by Merrill Lynch, which involved manipulation of Regs. §15A.435-1(c)(3)(I). ACM Partnership v. Comr.,
157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998); Boca Investerings Partnership v.
U.S., 314 F.3d 625 (D.C. Cir. 2003); ASA Investerings P’ship v.
Comr., 201 F.3d 505 (D.C. Cir. 2000). This ‘‘shelter’’ was designed for large corporations.
But the ACM victory was followed, and the subsequent contingent installment sale victories accompanied, by a string of three
defeats for the Service, two involving so-called ‘‘foreign tax credit
stripping’’ transactions. Compaq Computer Corp. v. Comr., 277
F.3d 778 (5th Cir. 2001); IES Indus. Inc. v. U.S., 253 F.3d 350 (8th
Cir. 2001); UPS of America v. Comr., 254 F.3d 1014 (11th Cir.
2001). These defeats involved the so-called ‘‘economic substance’’ doctrine, and after Compaq, IES, and UPS, it appeared the
Service would have a difficult time sustaining its position against
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firms that designed the shelters have faced extensive
litigation by taxpayers who have had to pay back
taxes.196 There is little such litigation by corporate
taxpayers against their advisers; only rarely do adverse outcomes affect these relationships. The pattern
of adviser-taxpayer alignment — where taxpayers or
other ‘‘tax-affected’’ parties accept large sacrifices,
even in terms of revenue (which is, after all and as
noted above, only money), to support a community of
adviser/intermediaries with whom those taxpayers
have alignments — is evident, too, in the evolution
and development of policy regarding Build America
Bonds (BABs) under the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (‘‘ARRA’’).197
the shelters, at least under the ‘‘economic substance’’ doctrine,
which the Service viewed as its primary weapon in the campaign.
The IRS enjoyed considerable success in the district courts and
the Federal Claims Court against the ‘‘son of BOSS’’ shelters, and
in some other shelter litigation; these, as noted, involved shelters
designed for wealthy individuals. But then, in 2006, the Service
won a landmark string of victories invoking ‘‘economic substance’’ against corporate shelters, in Black & Decker, Coltec, and
Castle Harbor, all of which (Coltec in particular) rested upon particularly stringent statements of the ‘‘economic substance’’ doctrine. This was followed in 2008 with BB&T, in which the Service prevailed against a ‘‘lease in/lease out’’ shelter, which, perhaps of all the ‘‘corporate tax shelters,’’ troubled the private bar
the most, because of the difficulty of distinguishing the transaction from a range of ‘‘leveraged lease’’ transactions which have
long been unchallenged, if indeed they have not been accepted, by
the Service. This was followed by a number of victories against
related ‘‘sale-in/sale-out’’ (SILO) shelters. Wells Fargo & Co. v.
U.S., 91 Fed. Cl. 35 (2010); Altria Group, Inc. v. U.S., 105
A.F.T.R. 2d 1419 (2010); cf. Consolidated Edison Co. v. U.S., 90
Fed. Cl. 228 (Fed. Cl. 2009).
Yet there is no indication of any litigation brought by corporate taxpayers who lost these decisions against advisers who recommended the transactions.
196
This litigation has been legion, especially with respect to
‘‘son of BOSS’’ structures, see Notice 2000-44, 2000-2 C.B. 625.
There are few reported decisions, owing mostly to the fact that the
litigation has tended to result in settlements between the clients
and their advisers. There are numerous reported decisions, however, with respect to issues that arise in the course of litigation,
and on two occasion matters occasioned by arbitration clauses in
connection with this tax shelter litigation reached the Supreme
Court. Arthur Andersen LLP v. Carlisle, 129 S. Ct. 1896, 173 L.
Ed. 2d 832 (5/4/09); Wachovia Bank v. Schmidt, 546 U.S. 303
(2005).
197
P.L. 111-5, §123. BABs are bonds issued by state and local
governments, which are fully taxable, but as to which the federal
government makes a payment to the issuer to reimburse the issuer
for 35% of the interest cost on the bond, originally limited to certain types of issues and to bonds issued in 2009 and 2010. The
provisions governing them are codified at §§54AA and 6431. The
first BABs were issued in April 2009, shortly after the enactment
of ARRA, and immediately questions were raised about the pricing of the bonds. The difficulty stemmed from the fact that the
35% payment was in excess of the ordinarily prevailing difference
between taxable and tax-exempt rates. Assume, for instance, that
the prevailing taxable and tax-exempt rates are 7% and 5.5%, respectively. If a municipality issues BABs at the taxable rate, it

gets a subsidy of 2.45%, reducing its after-subsidy yield to 4.55%,
well below the tax-exempt yield. It turned out, however, in the
early deals, that the state and local issuers were happy to receive
any rate that was lower than the tax-exempt rate. Thus, for instance, in the example, they would accept an after-subsidy rate of
5.2%, 100/65 of which is 8%. This enabled investment bankers to
secure bonds for a price reflecting an 8% return, and immediately
to ‘‘flip’’ the bond in a secondary market, where the price reflected
the ordinary taxable yield (7% in the example). See generally
Langbein, ‘‘Bloody BABs: Tax-Exempts, the Stimulus Act, and
Obama Tax Policy,’’ Tax Notes (6/22/09) at p. 1449, 1456 & nn.
50–51; Preston and Keogh, ‘‘Taxpayers Lose $328 Million in
Build America Profits (Update 3),’’ available at http://
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=
a6BUiSZsDKqo&refer=home (last visited May 5, 2009). This
meant a large and immediate profit — at times equal to 8% to
10% of the face amount of the bonds, virtually overnight — either
to the underwriters or first purchasers of the obligations.
My initial reaction to this situation was that it would be temporary; that state and municipal issuers would eventually (soon)
‘‘catch on,’’ and demand the best rate they could achieve. This did
not happen, however, and for something of a funny reason. See
McDonald, ‘‘Building America With Obama Bonds Signals Munis’
Fall,’’
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aQqI3SKPm.t4 (6/25/09)); Quint
and McDonald, ‘‘Even Mayor Daley Can’t Get Rates Taxpayers
Deserve
for
Chicago,’’ http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=abDvAmLrju6A); Preston, ‘‘Dallas
Hospital Sells Largest AAA Build America Bond,’’ http://
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
ag9S5KNtxQR4).
What was funny stemmed from the existence of a large community of intermediaries — banks, investment banks, lawyers, accountants — who constitute what one might call a ‘‘tax-exempt
bond’’ industry (this is an ‘‘interest group,’’ in terms of ‘‘interest
group theory,’’ discussed above. This ‘‘interest group’’ and its participants were horrified at first by the BABs proposal, because the
generosity of that proposal promised issuers a lower cost than ordinary tax-exempts: the fear was that BABs were a ‘‘foot in the
door’’ toward abolition of the tax exemption, and its replacement
with a BABs-type subsidy. Treasury officials and congressional
staffers repeatedly and emphatically sought to reassure the taxexempt bond community that this was not the intention of the legislation — that the BABs provision was temporary, and the historic exemption was not going away. See, e.g., 2009 TNT 188-5
(‘‘Ways and Means Tax Counsel Denies Exempt Financing Is
Threatened’’) (9/30/09). But the pressure to extend this assurance,
and to forestall opposition to the whole program by a large and
powerful ‘‘compliance’’ community, led the government to tolerate the form of ‘‘flipping’’ described above — and of deliberate
underpricing of the issues — because it meant that the all-in cost
of BABs was not much different from the cost of ordinary tax exempts, and thus mitigated the threat to the ‘‘ordinary’’ municipals
market that BABs originally had appeared to pose.
This situation could not go on forever. In the second session of
the 111th Congress, the ‘‘jobs bill’’ provided a BABs-type subsidy
to four categories of bonds that had been so-called ‘‘tax credit’’
bonds — bonds on which the issuer pays no interest but allow the
holder to claim tax credits equal to the amount of interest that
would have been paid had the bond been issued at a taxable rate
(with the credit includible in income). These provisions, however,
limited the payment Treasury made to a portion of the interest
payable at the lower of the actual rate on the bonds or a Treasury-
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C. Transfer Pricing and the Resolution
of International Issues Raised by the
Financial Crisis
Nor do the claims of A-YCD concerning past instances of U.S. ‘‘pioneering’’ in the international tax
area dispel these concerns. A-YCD cite three instances where they allege that the international community emulated U.S. innovations: the foreign tax
credit, CFCs, and the transfer pricing rules. While I
would concede the latter two instances, I believe the
first to be poorly documented. In any event, there are
innumerable other instances, many of recent vintage,
where other nations have at best ignored and at worst
attacked U.S. innovations: domestic international
sales corporations (DISCs); branch profits taxes; foreign sales corporations (FSCs); repeal of withholding
tax on portfolio interest; imposition of withholding requirements on qualified intermediaries; private foreign investment companies (PFICs), among many
others. And whatever the proclivities of U.S. trading
partners to emulate our practices in the 1920s or
1970s, one suspects those proclivities have weakened
in the face of economic expansion throughout the
world, especially in developing economies, especially
in ‘‘emerging markets,’’ to say nothing of the implosion of U.S. mortgage and financial markets and the
ensuing international financial crisis and ‘‘great recession’’ of 2007–08.
The fundamental difficulty I have with recent scholarship advocating formula apportionment, and detailing or depending upon a history of the 1985–95
‘‘transfer pricing wars,’’ is its treatment of the matter
mandated rate approximating a comparable taxable rate. See
Schroeder, ‘‘Obama Signs BABified Jobs Bill,’’ The Bond Buyer
(3/19/09). This puts some limit on ‘‘flipping.’’ Furthermore, the
original statute limits the amount of ‘‘premium’’ that BABs may
carry, and the ‘‘flipping’’ practice raises questions about what constitutes the ‘‘issue price’’ of the bonds, in turn raising questions
about whether the bonds bear an impermissible amount of premium. The Service has said it is exploring this issue. See McNichol, ‘‘New Jersey Flips BABs as IRS Scrutinizes Market,’’ http://
www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=
axRexrmESKjw (4/15/09) (last visited Apr. 17, 2010). And the
communities involved in pricing the issues are increasingly nervous. Schroeder, ‘‘Groups Consider Asking for Clarification on
BABs Prices,’’ The Bond Buyer (4/26/10) at p. x.
My point here is that the entire episode underscores the existence of important alignments between a community affected by
the tax law, a ‘‘tax-affected community’’ (here the issuers), which
constitutes one ‘‘interest group’’ (which here happens to consist of
public entities), on the one hand, and what I am calling a ‘‘compliance community’’ (here the tax exempt bond industry), a linked
but separate and distinct interest group, on the other. This episode
illustrates dramatically, I think, that the preservation of alignments
between ‘‘tax-affected communities’’ and ‘‘compliance communities’’ may sometimes be sufficiently important to the tax-affected
community, that, that community is willing to tolerate not only
very substantial ‘‘compliance’’ or ‘‘administration’’ costs rather
than risk a split with its ‘‘compliance community’’ allies; but also
to tolerate high costs in terms of revenue or taxes paid to the government, or savings foregone, in order to serve and preserve longstanding alignments.

as distinct, even isolated, from other, larger issues of
international tax and economic policy. Concededly,
this is a characteristic that to some extent afflicts tax
scholarship generally. But, as I think I have shown
above, the developments in transfer pricing between
1985 and 1995 cannot be fully or well understood
without reference to contemporaneous currents in
thought and policy about international economic matters generally.
This is especially important at the present time in
which the recent ‘‘financial crisis’’ has raised issues
requiring continued close international cooperation.
The pressure on institutions for such cooperation is
likely to intensify. The near collapse of major financial institutions worldwide has entailed costly government bailouts of the institutions, and the economic retrenchment that ensued in the wake of this near collapse has led to costly government efforts to stimulate
domestic economies. These in turn have generated
twin policy problems: first, the growing problem of
government budget deficits and debt levels, raising
questions of integrity of sovereign debt; second, the
search for institutional reform that will prevent similar crises in the future, and will obviate the need for
similar government bailouts.
In the U.S., in particular, the deficit problem has led
to the creation of a Presidential commission searching
for a set of proposals that will reduce and control budget deficits. The examination of this problem will almost certainly give consideration to international tax
avoidance, through ‘‘harmful tax competition,’’ abuse
of tax havens, and other matters.198 This is so because
the area appears to present the opportunity to collect
substantial revenues.
198
On Feb. 25, 2010, Rep. Richard Neal of Massachusetts,
Chair of the Subcommittee on Select Revenue Measures of the
House Ways and Means Committee, announced that the Subcommittee would conduct a study of transfer pricing this year. The announcement was made at the Tax Policy Council’s 11th annual
Practice and Policy Symposium in Washington. Rep. Neal said at
the same time there are no plans for further steps, such as hearings or the proposal of legislation. 2010 TNT 38-3 (2/26/10). On
July 22, 2010, the Ways and Means Committee held a hearing on
‘‘Transfer Pricing Issues.’’
In addition, as noted above, the Administration in its 2011 budget added a proposal concerning transfers of high-profit intangibles to low-tax countries to the international proposals set forth
in the 2010 budget. This proposal is not intended to affect transfer pricing rules, but it certainly touches an area near the heart of
contemporary concerns about the transfer pricing rules.
For discussion during the height of the financial crisis of the
potential impact of the crisis on the transfer pricing situation, see
‘‘Downturn Adds Intensity to Transfer Pricing Scrutiny, Says
Practitioner,’’ 2009 TNT 190-7 (10/2/09) (report of statements of
David Canale, director of transfer pricing controversy services for
Ernst & Young, in Oct. 1, 2009 interview with Tax Analysts concerning global survey conducted by E&Y); ‘‘Down Economy
Changes Approach to Transfer Pricing Analysis, IRS Economist
Says,’’ 2009 TNT 8-16 (1/13/09) (remarks of Michael Aarstol
head of the IRS advance pricing agreement (APA) program’s San
Francisco office, at a January 10 panel at the American Bar Association Section of Taxation meeting in New Orleans).
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With respect to financial reform, the area is also
certain to test the capacity of the international community to address some of the larger issues I have
here suggested afflicted the transfer pricing controversy in the early 1990s, namely, the tensions between
decentralized Anglo-American and more centralized
Euro-Japanese capitalism. In a recent column, titled
‘‘Financial Reform 101,’’ Professor Paul Krugman,
also a New York Times columnist, suggested that proposals for reform took one of two basic tracks.199
One, which Professor Krugman identified with former
Board of Governors Chair Paul Volcker, advocates
breaking up large financial institutions into smaller
pieces. The second, to which Professor Krugman
states he himself subscribes, focuses instead on leaving such institutions intact, but subjecting them to
greater regulation.
My own judgment on this general issue is that,
from the standpoint of domestic policy viewed in isolation, the first course, the Volcker course, is the preferable one; but that, as a practical matter, it is one that
is unavailable, because it will never be susceptible to
coordination with the policies of other major nations.
European nations have already made clear that they
would not go along with the ‘‘Volcker rule’’ proposed
by the Obama Administration, for separating proprietary trading activities from deposit-taking activity.200
And U.S. bank policy, from the late 1980s forward, in
both Democratic and Republican administrations, has
been driven by many of the same general conceptions
as drove the reaffirmation of arm’s-length in the
1990s: the decision to coordinate (and subordinate)
the more decentralized features of the American
economy to the more centralized forms of free enter-

199

New York Times (4/2/10) at p. 23.
See Vandore, Associated Press, ‘‘EU Keeps Eye on U.S. Financial Regulation Bill’’ (4/21/10) available at http://
www.google.com/hostednews/ap/article/ALeqM5htaxOSnaxoccLtrepd0TEA1VupQD9F7IMH00 (last visited 5/3/10);
Thesing and O’Brien, ‘‘ECB’s Weber Says Volcker Rule Has ‘Significant’
Shortcomings,’’
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/
news?pid=newsarchive&sid=apw5_SIOhgsE (last visited 5/3/10)
(statement of Alex Weber, member, European Central Bank, and
head of Germany’s Bundesbank).
200

prise prevailing in Europe, Japan, and, more lately, in
the emerging economies.201
Unlike the fiscal problems presented by international tax, however, it would seem the need for financial reform, particularly reform designed to mitigate
the possibility of future bailouts, is a more urgent one,
both economically and politically, and thus one not
likely to be swept under the rug in large or small
ways. And I believe some of the tensions about ‘‘globalization’’ policy will be resolved, or at least revealed, by the process of addressing them. Thus, I believe that a future examination of transfer pricing
policy, which appears to be on the horizon, should
await attempts by the international community to address the more immediate problems of financial reform.
The resolution of current issues is likely to take one
of two courses, either of which suggests the eventual
demise of arm’s-length. Even should the international
community commit itself, as it has to date, to continuing the policies of the last 20 years, of encouraging
‘‘globalization’’ through promoting the dominance of
large, privately controlled institutions, the result for
corporate taxes is likely to be either a continuation of
substantial reductions in corporate tax rates in the
world, or the outright abolition of the corporate tax.
Either would greatly diminish the importance of transfer pricing generally.
Should the international community, on the other
hand, and as appears more likely, decide to modify or
abandon the course of policy over the last 20 years,
asserting greater government control over large private enterprises and the private economy, and offering
greater protections to consumers, individuals, and
smaller, less integrated businesses, then it is likely to
retain and strengthen the corporate income tax. If it
does this, it will almost certainly have to address the
issue of transfer pricing, and will almost certainly
have to come to terms with the deficiencies of the putative international ‘‘arm’s-length’’ norm. It will then
have to address other international tax issues, including harmful competition and even base and rate ‘‘coordination.’’ And it is in that context that the development of procedures and norms for introducing formula apportionment can best proceed.
201

See generally Langbein, ‘‘The Thrift Crisis and the Constitution,’’ 53 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 159, 167–170 (1996).
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